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Empirical Doctrine 
Jessie Allen† 
Abstract 
We can observe and measure how legal decision makers use formal 
legal authorities, but there is no way to empirically test the deter-
minative capacity of legal doctrine itself. Yet discussions of empirical 
studies of judicial behavior sometimes conflate judges’ attention to legal 
rules with legal rules determining outcomes. Doctrinal determinacy is 
not the same thing as legal predictability. The extent to which legal 
outcomes are predictable in given contexts is surely testable empirically. 
But the idea that doctrine’s capacity to produce or limit those outcomes 
can be measured empirically is fundamentally misguided. The problem 
is that to measure doctrinal determinacy, we would have to adopt 
standards of legal correctness that violate fundamental conceptual and 
normative aspects of the legal institution we wish to study. In practice 
the promise of empirical data on doctrinal determinacy makes it seem 
less urgent to investigate other contributions doctrinal reasoning makes 
to law. Doctrinal reasoning might affect decision makers in ways that 
contribute importantly to the legal process without determining 
outcomes. Trying to understand those effects is a research project to 
which the empirical methods of social science have much to contribute. 
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Introduction 
“adjective: empirical 
based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or 
experience rather than theory or pure logic.” 
—Concise Oxford English Dictionary1 
For most of the last century, legal theorists ignored the work of 
political scientists who studied judicial decision-making. But lately legal 
scholars look to empiricists to validate or reevaluate conceptual theories 
about how law works. Empirical observations can certainly reveal 
whether legal decision makers pay attention to formal legal doctrine. 
And empirical methods can measure the predictability of legal outcomes 
in various contexts. But sometimes claims about the capacity of 
empirical legal studies appear to go further. Sometimes legal theorists 
suggest that, in a given jurisdiction, we could empirically test whether 
“there are cases, statutes, maxims, principles, canons, authorities, or 
statements in learned legal treatises available to justify decisions in 
favor of both parties in all or at least most litigated cases,”2 or, if the 
available legal authorities justify uniquely correct legal outcomes in 
most, or at least some, cases.3 This is a claim that legal scholars could 
 
1.  Empirical, Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th rev. ed. 2008).  
2. Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer 135 (2009) [hereinafter 
Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer]. 
3. See, e.g., id. at 138–39 (asserting that the contention that “in looking for a legal 
justification for an outcome selected on other grounds, judges in complex, messy 
common-law systems will rarely (but not never) be disappointed” is an 
empirical claim); Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A Companion to 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 271 (1999) (“[T]he real dispute 
[about rule determinacy in law] is not conceptual, but empirical; it concerns 
how often rules do or do not matter (causally) in adjudication.”); Joseph 
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale 
L.J. 1, 14 (1984) [hereinafter Singer, Cards] (explaining that the contention that 
legal rules are less determinate than traditional theorists claim is “an empirical 
question” whose “truth depends on specific demonstrations of how 
individual . . . rules fail to provide determinate resolutions of competing 
principles”). But cf. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: 
Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462, 495 (1987) (concluding 
that the question of indeterminacy is “partly empirical and partly conceptual”). 
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empirically measure “doctrinal determinacy.” This article explains why 
that claim is false. 
It matters whether doctrinal determinacy can be measured 
empirically. Judges, lawyers, and the general public all act as if legal 
doctrine is substantively determinate and at the same time profess to 
know that it is not. As Keith Bybee puts it:  
On the one hand, judicial decision making is portrayed . . . as a 
matter of legal principle and impartial reason . . . guided by a 
shared set of publicly stated rules and norms. On the other hand, 
judicial decision making is portrayed . . . as a matter of 
preference and politics, an activity largely driven by the personal 
beliefs and policy commitments that judges bring to the bench.4  
If we could measure doctrinal determinacy, we could reconcile these 
two perennially opposing views in a compromise position that recog-
nized some limited form of determinacy. Such a compromise is desirable 
because faith in some degree of doctrinal determinacy underwrites the 
enforcement of judicial decisions, which, after all, continue to be written 
in doctrinal language. 
This article aims to show why it is not possible to empirically 
measure the sort of doctrinal determinacy that could legitimize law 
enforcement. That does not mean rejecting empirical social science 
research as a method for understanding legal decision-making. In 
particular, the degree to which legal outcomes are predictable in given 
contexts is surely observable empirically and is an important piece of 
information.5 But doctrinal determinacy is not the same thing as legal 
predictability.6 Legal outcomes often are predictable because of factors 
 
4. Keith J. Bybee, Paying Attention to What Judges Say: New Directions in the 
Study of Judicial Decision Making, 8 Ann. Rev. L. Soc. Sci. 69, 70 (2012). 
5. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin et al., Competing Approaches to Predicting 
Supreme Court Decision Making, 2 Persp. on Pol. 761, 763 (2004) 
[hereinafter Competing Approaches] (reporting statistical model’s ability 
to accurately predict results of U.S. Supreme Court cases 75% of the time 
based on non-doctrinal factors).  
6. Indeed, if determinacy is reduced to predictability, the question of the 
extent of doctrine’s determinacy collapses. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously 
asserted that law is nothing but the prediction of what courts would do. O. 
W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 457 (1897). As 
Brian Leiter explains, in this radically positivist view, where law is just 
what official decision makers say it is, every official legal outcome is 
necessarily correct. Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence 70 
(2007) [hereinafter Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence]. In such a 
regime, the idea of doctrinal determinacy is incoherent, because preexisting 
legal materials can never determine an outcome that differs from any official 
legal decision. Doctrine has no possible determinant role, because “a judge 
who asks herself what the law is turns out . . . to really be asking herself, 
‘what do I think I will do’?” Id. See also H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of 
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that are not traceable to doctrine.7 Predicting how a lawsuit will come 
out is not the same thing as demonstrating that the case should be 
decided only one way based on the available legal authorities, and that 
is the determinacy question. The bottom line is that empirical methods 
can be used to observe how judges engage with doctrine in reaching 
legal decisions, but there is no way to empirically measure doctrine’s 
capacity to determine those decisions.8 
The aim here is not to devalue empirical legal studies. Nor is the 
goal to criticize legal empiricists, who for the most part avoid conflating 
data on how judges go about using legal materials with evidence about 
the extent to which those materials produce determinate legal answers. 
Rather, this article aims to sweep away misguided interpretations of 
empirical work. 
The promise of empirically observing the extent of substantive 
doctrinal determinacy tends to divert interest away from more 
promising empirical questions. So long as we remain stuck in a miasmic 
sense that doctrine must be somewhat determinate in a way that might 
be shown empirically, it is hard to motivate the search for other less 
familiar doctrinal effects. My next article will draw on some recent work 
in psychology to propose a way that formal legal doctrine might 
produce psychological and social effects that could contribute to a 
distinctively legal process, apart from producing determinate answers. 
This research is discussed briefly below.9 
Much of my argument in this article is framed in opposition to 
assertions of Frederick Schauer, probably the foremost living proponent 
of law as a formal rule-based system. I take issue with Schauer’s 
repeated suggestions that the extent of doctrinal determinacy, or 
indeterminacy, is an “empirical” question.10 But the larger project is 
broadly congruent with Schauer’s understanding of legal reasoning as a 
distinctive rule-focused social practice and has been greatly influenced 
 
Law, 81–88 (1961) (describing the obligatory aspect of legal rules as 
distinguishing the concept of legality from predictability). 
7. See Competing Approaches, supra note 5. See also Brian S. Clarke, The Clash 
of Old and New Fourth Circuit Ideologies: Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau 
Corp. and the Moderation of the Fourth Circuit, 66 S.C. L. Rev. 927, 938, 
941–46 (2015) (noting increased likelihood of employee success in workplace 
discrimination cases after a raft of judicial appointments by a liberal 
Democratic president and correctly predicting en banc reversal of decision for 
employer by panel with conservative Republican-appointed majority).  
8. By “doctrine” I mean to encompass not just case law but all formal legal 
sources: cases, statutes, regulations, rules, maxims, principles, canons of 
interpretation—any conventionally recognized materials and methods of 
legal analysis. 
9. See infra Part III.  
10. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 139. 
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by Schauer’s work. Schauer has long argued that the distinctive quality 
of legal reasoning is related to its rule-based nature but does not depend 
entirely on whether legal rules determine outcomes.11 Investigating what 
formal doctrinal reasoning contributes to legal reasoning, even if rules 
never substantively determine answers, is in some ways an extension of 
Schauer’s emphasis on the phenomenology of rule-based reasoning in 
law. 
On a methodological level, this article aims to contribute to New 
Legal Realism, an approach to legal scholarship that seeks to build “a 
bridge between formal law and the social sciences.”12 The original 
Realists of the early twentieth century tended to dismiss formal legal 
methods either as trivial window dressing or a pernicious obfuscation 
of the political forces that really drove legal outcomes.13 But self-
identified New Legal Realists consider that legal forms have meaning.14 
Clarifying what empirical studies can and cannot show about the role 
of legal doctrine should help advance the New Legal Realist inquiry into 
“when and how formal law matters.”15 
There is an urgent pragmatic reason for gaining a better under-
standing of what formal doctrinal reasoning contributes to legal 
decision-making. At least in the United States, there is a pronounced 
shift away from adjudication based on formal doctrinal analysis toward 
informal settlement and alternative dispute resolution.16 Identified legal  
11. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 406 n.16 
(1985) [hereinafter Schauer, Easy Cases] (“It is quite simply a blunder to 
hold that, because a factor may be overridden or outbalanced by other 
factors, it is not a factor in the decision process.”). 
12. Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and 
Conditional Theory, 67 SMU L. Rev. 141, 143 (2014). 
13. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1014, 1015 (1928) (“Hence ‘law’ as here conceived is . . . the 
power of passing judgment through formal political agencies for securing 
social control.”). See also Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and 
the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 821 (1935) (“Legal 
concepts . . . are supernatural entities which do not have a verifiable 
existence except to the eyes of faith.”). 
14. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 12 at 145. See also Jessie Allen, 
Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 Tul. L. Rev. 389, 398 (2011) 
(quoting Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal 
Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 
Cornell L. Rev. 61, 125 (2009) (“[N]ew realists do not, or anyway 
should not, ‘simply reject law’s formal qualities as meaningless.’”)). 
15. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 12, at 145. 
16. See Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 Vill. L. 
Rev. 771 (2008) (“Of one hundred civil cases filed, trials start in fewer than 
two.”); Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. Disp. Resol. 7 
(2006) (“[T]here is an abundance of data that shows that trials . . . are 
declining precipitously.”). 
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conflicts are increasingly resolved through mediation, arbitration, plea-
bargaining, and negotiation. Part of the reason the shift toward less 
formal treatment of legal conflicts is deemed acceptable and thought 
not to destabilize the rule of law is the belief that these informal 
resolutions take place “in the shadow of the law.”17 The idea is that the 
results of these nondoctrinal resolutions are constrained, or at least 
shaped, by a background of substantive rules, principles, and values 
established by applicable legal authorities. But if legality resides more 
in the formal practice than the substance of doctrinal reasoning, by 
shifting to informal, all-things-considered negotiation we are giving up 
the aspect of our legal institutions that constitutes legality. 
Something paradoxical is happening. In the last half of the 
twentieth century, court dockets were surging while, at the same time, 
social scientists who studied judicial decision-making were bent on 
showing that the legal doctrines courts ostensibly applied did not 
actually drive legal outcomes. Today, empirical legal studies sometimes 
hypothesize that doctrine is involved significantly in legal decision-
making. At the same time, legal claims are more likely to be resolved 
nondoctrinally. Ironically, at the moment of increasing consensus that 
formal legal authorities “matter,” we are busy dismantling the formal 
practices that have been the traditional mode of applying those 
authorities to conflicts. Once it seemed that skeptical critiques and 
evidence of judges’ “attitudinal” decision-making threatened formal 
doctrinal practice. But now it is as though increased confidence in the 
substantive role of legal doctrine has made formal doctrinal reasoning 
practices seem superfluous. 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly reviews some 
writings by legal theorists suggesting that doctrinal indeterminacy can 
be measured empirically. Part II is the heart of the article—it argues 
the impossibility of obtaining empirical evidence of doctrinal determin-
acy. Part II first points out that existing empirical work does not 
measure doctrinal determinacy, despite suggestions to the contrary in 
some reports of empirical legal studies. Then I consider how we might 
go about empirically testing doctrinal determinacy if we could use any 
imaginable method. Part II concludes that even under ideal circum-
stances, empirical methods cannot measure doctrine’s ability to deter-
mine legal outcomes. Part III briefly considers some research and policy 
implications of recognizing the problems of an empirical approach to 
legal doctrine.  
17. See e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979) 
(discussing how divorcing parents bargaining over the division of money 
and custody are influenced by what would happen if the case went to 
trial); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
Harv. L. Rev. 2463 (2004) (discussing the expectation that when parties 
plea bargain, they do so by relying on expected trial outcomes).  
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I. Seeing Doctrinal Indeterminacy as an  
Empirical Question 
“As a set of empirical claims, the Realist program can hardly now 
be condemned as largely false or celebrated as largely true.” 
—Frederick Schauer18 
“The slaying of conceptualism has been quite successful.” 
—Joseph William Singer19 
Legal scholars sometimes assert that the extent of doctrinal 
indeterminacy in our legal system is an unanswered “empirical” 
question.20 At first glance, this might seem like an unproblematic claim. 
After all, when we ask to what extent doctrine is determinate, we are 
asking about a state of affairs in the real world not about an imaginary 
society or an abstract ideal. As the Realists pointed out in the 1920s, 
we cannot decide a priori or as a matter of faith that legal doctrine 
provides definite answers to any particular legal question in any real 
time and place.21 Just because society may think of law as a set of 
preexisting rules capable of determining outcomes does not necessarily 
mean that any such materials exist.22  Observing how decision makers 
use legal doctrine, however, cannot measure that doctrine’s capacity to 
determine correct legal outcomes. 
Suggestions that empirical studies might illuminate doctrinal 
determinacy or indeterminacy have come from theorists across the 
political and interpretive spectrum. For instance, in an influential late 
twentieth-century article explicating critical legal studies, Joseph Singer 
stressed that indeterminacy is an empirical question.23 As he put it, “the 
claim that law is indeterminate . . . is an empirical claim about existing 
legal theories and arguments,” as opposed to “a claim that it is 
impossible to invent determinate theories” of law or “a claim about the 
 
18. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 147. 
19. Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 475 (1988) 
(reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927–1960 (1986)).  
20. See sources cited supra note 3. 
21. See, e.g., Green, supra note 13, at 1014 (“The rules, for the most part . . . are 
still liquid.”); Cohen, supra note 13, at 847 (“[D]ecisions themselves are not 
products of logical parthenogenesis born of pre-existing legal principles but 
are social events with social causes and consequences.”). 
22. Cf. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 12 note (1930) (pointing 
out that a flying carpet, or, “wishing rug” would be a handy mode of inter-
continental transportation, but that doesn’t mean that such a thing exists). 
23. Singer, Cards, supra note 3, at 10.  
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nature of reason or the human mind or anything like that.”24 Moreover, 
Singer went on to suggest that doctrinal indeterminacy can—and 
should—be proved. He explained that doctrinal indeterminacy “is an 
empirical question, and its truth depends on specific demonstrations of 
how individual theories or rules fail to provide determinate resolution 
of competing principles.”25 
Frederick Schauer’s approach to legal theory is often at odds with 
Singer’s critical perspective. But, like Singer, Schauer finds it useful, 
and apparently uncontroversial, to emphasize that the extent of legal 
determinacy or indeterminacy is an empirical matter. For instance, in 
his 2009 book, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Schauer stresses repeatedly that 
legal indeterminacy is “an empirical claim”26 and suggests that the 
extent of determinacy can and should be measured empirically.27 
Schauer defines the realists’ indeterminacy challenge as “the claim 
that there are cases, statutes, maxims, principles, canons, authorities, 
or statements in learned legal treatises available to justify decisions in 
favor of both parties in all or at least most litigated cases.”28 In other 
words, “[i]f a decision for the plaintiff can be justified by reference to 
standard legal sources, and if a decision for the defendant can also be 
justified by referring to standard (albeit different) legal sources, then 
the law is not actually resolving the dispute.”29 According to Schauer, 
the realists recognized that this “question was an empirical one: just 
how often are there legal rules, principles, and sources available to 
justify both of two mutually exclusive outcomes?”30 Moreover, Schauer 
adds that because this is an empirical question, we should not expect 
 
24. Id. 
25. Singer, Cards, supra note 3, at 14. Note that demonstrating how doctrinal 
rules fail to determine answers echoes the standard empirical method of 
falsifying hypotheses. 
26. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 11. And he has 
been making that claim or something close to it for 25 years. See 
Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical 
Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 
194–96 (1991) [hereinafter Schauer, Playing by the Rules]. 
27. On the first point, Schauer asserts that the actual existence of a distinctive 
form of legal reasoning that focuses on following rules “is in the final 
analysis an empirical claim,” and observes, “[m]ost people can describe a 
unicorn, but our ability to describe a unicorn is not inconsistent with the 
crucial fact that there are no actual unicorns in the world.” Schauer, 
Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 11. 
28. Id. at 135. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 135–36. 
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the answer to be the same “for all times, for all places, for all judges, 
and, perhaps most importantly, for all issues and for all courts.”31 
In a section labeled “An Empirical Claim,” Schauer goes on to 
discuss some recent empirical legal studies focused on state courts and 
federal trial and intermediate appellate courts.32 There he observes, 
“when we look at the conclusions of that research, we see that legal 
doctrine appears to play a considerably larger role in judicial decision- 
making than the more extreme of the Realists supposed.”33 Judges’ 
practices in consulting doctrines and the predictability of legal out-
comes are clearly phenomena that we can observe and measure 
empirically. But Schauer does not seem to be limiting his prescription 
for empirical studies to the question of how judges approach legal 
materials. He seems to be calling for empirical investigations of the 
extent to which legal materials determine outcomes. 
At the end of a recent article on Realism, for example, he urges 
that “the full breadth of empirical approaches” be applied to examine 
“the divergence between real and paper rules” of judicial decision.34 
There he explains: 
[A]ny properly designed empirical inquiry will include within its 
compass not only the instances in which something other than 
the paper rule appeared to produce a legal result, but also the 
instances in which the paper rule actually influenced the 
outcome.35 
He concludes by emphasizing that “the extent to which paper rules 
are followed or influential is an empirical question not answerable by a 
selected anecdote or an unrepresentative example” and instead requires 
developing a testable hypothesis about the effect of law on the decisions 
of judges and testing of those hypotheses.36 This looks like a proposal 
to observe and measure the ability of existing doctrine to determine 
legal outcomes using the experimental methods of social science. That 
observation and measurement is what I will argue cannot be achieved 
without obscuring or abandoning the distinctive normative character of 
legal doctrinal analysis. 
If the issue were posed directly, both Singer and Schauer would 
likely agree that the substantive determinacy of formal doctrine (as 
 
31. Id. at 139. 
32. Id. at 138–42. 
33. Id. at 140. 
34. Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 749, 777 (2013) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed]. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 778. 
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opposed to judges’ use of doctrine) cannot be observed without making 
normative judgments. Outside of Supreme Court confirmation hearings, 
no sophisticated legal thinker defends a version of legal reasoning in 
which preexisting legal authorities determine outcomes mechanically, 
without the involvement of some subjective judgment from the decision 
maker. Schauer has described a complex, contextual version of rule 
following that includes a role for social norms and linguistic indetermin-
acy.37 Moreover, given Schauer’s scholarly focus on the phenomenology 
of legal decision-making, it might make sense to read his statements 
about the empirical nature of determinacy claims as referring only to 
the question of whether and how judges actually engage with doctrine 
and not to the determinative capacity of the doctrine itself. That said, 
when Schauer repeatedly asserts the empirical nature of the Realist 
claim that doctrine is mostly indeterminate, follows those assertions 
with references to existing empirical legal studies and calls for more 
empirical research. It is hard not to read him as asserting that the 
determinate nature of legal doctrine is empirically observable without 
relying on controversial normative claims. 
Part of the problem is that treating doctrinal determinacy as 
empirically measurable can be very appealing as a way to resolve a 
longstanding conceptual and moral conflict. Legal theorists live with a 
contradiction between the ideal of source-based rule of law (not “rule 
of men”38) and the recognition that legal rules do not independently 
supply objective legal outcomes. An empirical approach to determinacy 
seems to offer relief. If we could systematically measure the degree of 
doctrinal indeterminacy in a given situation, then we could recognize 
the limits of legal certainty and resolve the dissonance between these 
two approaches. 
The political scientists who conduct empirical legal studies seem 
generally to be immune to this tempting resolution, probably because 
for the most part they simply are not thinking about law in these 
conceptual terms. They study how judges approach legal decision-
making and develop ways of predicting legal outcomes. Nevertheless, 
legal empiricists sometimes make statements about their findings that 
could be misinterpreted as claims that empirical data counts as evidence 
not just of decision makers’ practices but also of the determinative 
capacity of the legal materials that those decision makers engage. If the 
empiricists and theorists are not themselves confused on these points, I 
daresay their readers may be. Moreover, empiricists sometimes adopt 
methods of setting external standards of legal correctness that appear 
 
37. See Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra note 26, at 64–68, 118 
(noting “[i]t is a post-Wittgensteinian commonplace that rules do not 
determine their own application”). 
38. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 10; See Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 US 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United States 
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”).  
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to presume at least some level of doctrinal determinacy. It is therefore 
worth thinking through the problems with the view that doctrinal 
determinacy can be observed and proved (or disproved) empirically. 
II. Doctrinal Determinacy Is Not Measurable 
Empirically 
“But as to listening to what one lawyer says without asking 
another—I wonder at a man o’ your cleverness, Mr. Dill. It’s well 
known there’s always two sides, if no more; else who’d go to law, 
I should like to know?” 
—George Eliot, Middlemarch (Ch. 71)39 
I want to return to Frederick Schauer’s articulation of the basic 
indeterminacy question: whether “there are cases, statutes, maxims, 
principles, canons, authorities, or statements in learned legal treatises 
available to justify decisions in favor of both parties in all or at least 
most litigated cases.”40 Again, note that the question apparently being 
asked is not whether judges consult identifiable preexisting legal 
authorities in order to make legal rulings. Nor is the question whether 
judges believe that those authorities direct them to one or another 
ruling or whether their use of those materials in their decisions follows 
predictable patterns. The determinacy question is whether the standard 
authorities actually do direct one ruling or another in any given case. 
This is the question that is not illuminated by empirical legal studies. 
Whether judges engage in the forms of analysis Schauer identifies more 
broadly as distinctively legal—making sincere attempts to follow legal 
rules, treating certain sources as authoritative, respecting precedent—
is an empirical question. Likewise, judges’ subjective experience of the 
rules’ guidance could be studied empirically, and we can certainly test 
the success of different methods of predicting legal outcomes and make 
inferences about the role of different factors in the decision-making 
process, including both changes in doctrine and judicial characteristics. 
But it is not an empirical question whether available legal rules actually 
determine uniquely correct legal outcomes; that is, it is not a question 
that is answerable through observation. 
The basic problem is that any conceivable method for establishing 
legal doctrinal determinacy (as opposed to mere predictability) requires 
us to adopt a baseline of legal correctness. And we cannot adopt such 
a standard without making judgments that either violate the crucial 
conceptual and normative distinction between legal authority and 
popular consensus or forcing people to adopt individual interpretations 
 
39. George Eliot, Middlemarch 689 (Zodiac Press 1950) (1872).  
40. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 135. 
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of legal doctrine that are no more authoritative than the ones the 
researchers are trying to study. 
For example, suppose a study asks 1,000 lawyers to use the legal 
doctrine available in a particular jurisdiction to resolve a particular 
legal question. If 999 of the research subjects resolve the question with 
the same outcome, the results might be interpreted quantitatively to 
show that the available authority is legally determinate. But conflating 
the legal decision makers’ consensus with legal doctrine’s capacity to 
determine decisions violates our understanding of the rule-based 
determinacy we were trying to investigate in the first place. 
To avoid this problem, researchers might instead evaluate the 
persuasiveness of the analysis of their research subjects’ analyses or 
simply identify what results the preexisting legal doctrine should 
produce, perhaps with help from experts in the doctrinal field in which 
the case arises. But as a prominent legal empiricist points out, it is not 
clear why any of those external opinions about the correct legal result 
would provide “a legal model test that is more authoritative and 
reliable” than the decision makers whose rulings are being studied.41 
Nevertheless, empirical legal studies, and especially legal theorists’ 
discussions of those studies, often gloss over this crucial normative 
judgment. 
A. Existing Empirical Studies Do Not Measure Doctrinal Determinacy 
There are three basic kinds of empirical studies that this article will 
discuss: (1) analyses of judicial opinions that look for correlations 
between judges’ decisions and various characteristics of the judges 
making those decisions, (2) analyses of judicial decisions that aim to 
measure the role of legal authorities in those decisions, and (3) 
experimental studies that observe subjects’ resolutions of hypothetical 
legal problems, measure the subjects’ cultural and political attitudes 
and observe whether and how those attitudes correlate with the 
subjects’ decisions. Some of these studies provide evidence that decision 
makers’ political ideology and other attitudes affect their resolutions of 
legal questions, and other studies emphasize that such factors appear 
relatively insignificant.42 None of these studies, however, measure the 
 
41. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
91 Calif. L. Rev. 1457, 1467 (2003). 
42. The vast majority of quantitative empirical studies of U.S. Supreme Court 
decision-making conclude that outcomes are significantly affected by the 
justices’ political ideology, but the findings regarding the role of ideology 
on lower federal courts and state courts are more mixed. See Charles 
Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 
Cornell L. Rev. 191, 206–215 (2012) (“Cognitive psychology therefore 
suggests that judges . . . may sincerely believe that their rulings are 
grounded in an analysis of law alone, even though their predilections 
influence their rulings.”); Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the 
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extent to which doctrine actually determines the answers legal decision 
makers choose. 
1. Looking for Correlations between Judges’ Characteristics and Legal 
Outcomes in Large Databases of Judicial Opinions 
Late twentieth-century empirical legal research established a role 
for ideology in judicial decision-making, often by comparing legal 
outcomes with indicators of the political preferences of the deciding 
judges.43 Much of this research focused on the U.S. Supreme Court.44 
Empirical research also demonstrated significant correlations between 
the partisan affiliations of intermediate appellate judges and the 
political valence of decisions in some specific areas of the law (e.g., 
employment discrimination and labor cases) or in other discrete cat-
egories of cases (e.g., en banc decisions).45 Regarding judicial character-
istics other than partisan affiliation, researchers have found correlations 
between lower federal court judges’ race and their patterns of ruling in 
voting rights and racial harassment cases.46 But other recent studies,  
U.S. Courts of Appeals 16–18, 24–25 (2007) (discussing his study 
regarding ideological effects on judicial decision-making); David Klein, 
Law in Judicial Decision Making, SSRN (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2541743 [http://perma.cc/K6TN-AGQC] (“The pretense that 
judicial decision making can be accomplished purely through value-free 
analysis of legal materials often appears in judicial confirmation battles.”).  
43. These studies often use the party of a federal judge’s nominating president 
as a proxy for conservative or liberal ideology. See Lee Epstein, William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 71–81 
(2013) (discussing various measures of judicial ideology and critiquing the 
presidential party measure). 
44. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes 
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 557 (1989); 
Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model (1993); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, 
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002). 
45. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region 
on Voting Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1955-1986, 43 
W. Pol. Q. 317 (1990) (discussing “significant differences in the voting 
patterns of Democratic and Republican judges on a wide spectrum of issues”); 
Cass Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis 
of the Federal Judiciary 147 (2006) (“Republican appointees differ from 
Democratic appointees. . . . [W]e see significant differences in such areas as 
campaign finance legislation, affirmative action, . . . labor law, and much 
more.”); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking 
on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1635, 1640 (1998) (Under this 
theory, we can predict circuit court judicial behavior in en banc cases based 
on the judges’ policy preferences . . . and/or their compulsion to win.”). 
46. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2008) (“This Article provides the first systematic 
evidence that judicial ideology and race are closely related to findings of 
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working with a data base of thousands of appellate cases that cover a 
wide range of doctrinal areas over a period of some seventy years, have 
found little correlation between appellate judges’ personal and political 
characteristics and their patterns of decision-making in the mass of 
cases adjudicated.47 
For instance, Frank Cross looked at 27,024 judicial votes in federal 
court of appeals cases and found that judges’ political ideology had little 
impact on their votes for case outcomes.48 Similarly, Epstein, Landes, 
and Posner’s analysis of two large databases of federal court of appeals 
cases shows that judges appointed by Republican presidents are only 
slightly (4.5 percent) more likely to vote for conservative outcomes than 
Democratic appointees.49 In civil cases Republican appointees cast votes 
coded conservative only 3 percent more often than Democrats.50 In 
criminal cases the split is wider, but still more of a crack then a crevasse. 
Republican appointees were 6 percent more likely to vote for results 
that are coded conservative.51 The percentage of votes coded conserv-
ative across all cases was 55 percent for judges appointed by Republican 
presidents and 49 percent for Democratic appointees; liberal votes were 
36 percent for Republicans and 43 percent for Democrats.52 In other 
words, both Republican and Democratic appointed judges cast conserv-
ative votes more often than they voted for liberal outcomes. 
Thus studies indicate little individual partisan or ideological 
influence on most decisions in lower federal courts. This in itself is an 
interesting and useful finding and one that contravenes a simple picture 
of judges deliberately manipulating legal outcomes to produce political 
effects. One cannot conclude, however, that any time judges are not 
pursuing partisan or ideological goals, their decisions somehow are being 
determined by preexisting legal rules, or, for that matter, that those 
decisions are not driven by shared political views. Evidence that 
 
liability in voting rights cases.”); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The 
Realism of Race in Judicial Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis of 
Plaintiffs’ Race and Judges’ Race, 28 Harv. J. on Racial & Ethnic 
Just. 91, 91 (2012) (“[The article] finds that judges of different races reach 
different conclusions, with non-African American judges less likely to hold 
for the plaintiffs.”). 
47. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 43; Cross, supra note 42.  
48. Cross, supra note 42, at 24. Cross used a measure of judicial ideology 
that incorporated both presidential and senatorial preferences. Id. 
49. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 43, at 168. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. The percentages of liberal and conservative votes for each group do not 
add to one hundred percent because some case outcome votes were coded 
“mixed” (i.e., neither liberal nor conservative). Id. at 159.  
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political differences are not the main motivating factor in most court 
decisions does not mean that legal doctrine is determining those 
decisions. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to equate evidence negating 
alleged partisan or ideological biases or biases driven by identifiable 
personal factors like race, gender, and religion with proof that decisions 
are caused by objective legal doctrine or to characterize the research 
findings in ways that seem to imply that is the case. 
For instance, a study of trial judges’ treatment of civil rights and 
prisoner suits in three federal district courts found that judges’ partisan 
political affiliations, religion, gender, and professional background 
characteristics produced no significant differences in the outcomes of 
the cases assigned to them.53 The authors are careful to point out that 
their study does not prove “that there are no differences” in the way 
judges with different backgrounds decide cases.54 But they are not so 
cautious about the way they describe the influence of “the law.”55 They 
conclude that their results show that “[i]n the mass of cases that are 
filed, even civil rights and prisoner cases, the law—not the judge—
dominates the outcomes.”56 The political scientists who made this 
statement surely recognize that it refers to the decision-making 
approach of judges, not to the determinative capacity of preexisting 
legal authorities. But for legal theorists grappling with concerns about 
the legitimacy of enforcing judicial decisions, the temptation is to read 
this as a claim to evidence that doctrine actually determines outcomes. 
Of course the study results show no such thing. 
When judicial outcomes do not reflect ideological patterns, that 
supports an inference that judges’ decisions are being driven by 
something other than individual ideological differences. But it does not 
mean (1) that this result is accomplished through a process in which 
judges are attending to legal doctrine, (2) that the available legal 
doctrine is objectively narrowing the range of possible outcomes, or (3) 
that doctrine could justify only the decisions actually produced and not 
alternative outcomes. Most important for the project here, only the first 
of these possibilities is even susceptible to empirical investigation. 
The problem is that uniformity in judicial outcomes is not empirical 
evidence that those outcomes were determined by legal doctrine. The 
fact that decision makers tend to agree on the correct outcome might 
make that outcome predictable, but it does not necessarily make that 
outcome correct in an objective sense. And the notion of doctrinal 
determinacy of the sort that comes up when we talk about legitimate 
 
53. Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and 
the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 
24 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1995). 
54. Id. at 281. 
55. Id.  
56. Id. 
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law enforcement seems to require just this kind of objectivity to be 
meaningful. 
This is fundamentally a conceptual, rather than methodological, 
point. Even if agreement among trained legal decision makers suggests 
the answer they favor is correct, using that agreement as evidence of 
legal correctness runs afoul of the distinction between subjective 
judgment and objective legal sources implicated in the very idea of 
doctrinal determinacy and the ideal of rule of law such determinacy is 
meant to support. We should not equate legal consensus or predict-
ability with doctrinal determinacy. Doing so means adopting a view of 
legality contrary to the most basic understanding of law as something 
other than popular or professional opinion. Doctrinal determinacy (as 
opposed to sheer predictability) is interesting exactly because we see 
determinacy as a way to achieve the separation of law from opinion. So 
it makes no sense to prove determinacy with opinion. 
2. Studies of Legal Authority’s Influence on Judges 
In some cases, researchers set out to study more directly the 
influence of formal legal sources on judicial outcomes. For instance, 
researchers look to see whether rulings in high courts that are said to 
change preexisting doctrine precipitate changes in lower court decision-
making. Several studies track federal appellate court rulings in different 
doctrinal areas, looking to see whether lower courts adjust their 
decision-making substantively after new Supreme Court decisions in 
those areas.57 
Again, there are (at least) two different questions at stake when we 
ask what role a new legal precedent plays in subsequent judicial rulings. 
One is the behavioral question whether judges pay attention to legal 
doctrine. A distinct question is whether, if judges attend to it, legal 
doctrine can determine or constrain legal outcomes and, if so, how. The 
research on courts’ reactions to precedent may suggest that judges make 
sincere efforts to follow legal doctrine, but that does not necessarily 
show that doctrine actually leads judges to uniquely correct legal 
outcomes. Even if judges sincerely care about law and strive to follow 
 
57. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 41, at 1468–1469 (summarizing findings from a 
number of studies); Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 383, 429 (2007) (“Some [lower courts] may be more likely to see their 
decisions as bound by higher court precedent, while others will read those 
decisions narrowly, leaving them substantial discretion to decide the issue 
before them.”); Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event 
History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of 
Precedent, 64 J. Pol. 534, 534 (2002) (noting that “several variables are 
relevant to the compliance decision”); Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, 
Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial Voting: 
Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 963, 
967 (1992) (discussing when and how judges feel constrained by precedent). 
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legal rules or justify outcomes reached in other ways on the basis of 
preexisting legal rules, that will only result in doctrinal determinacy if 
preexisting legal rules do, in fact, direct or limit correct legal outcomes. 
Political scientists generally are careful to keep the question of judges’ 
motivations separate from the power of doctrine to determine outcomes. 
So for instance, in his study of intermediate appellate courts’ responses 
to other courts’ rulings, David E. Klein frames his hypotheses and 
conclusions in terms of the impact of judges’ “legal goals” and “policy 
goals,” rather than the results of ideology or doctrine.58 But sometimes 
legal scholars or others who refer to this type of research seem to 
conflate evidence that judges respond to precedent with proof that 
precedent is objectively determinate. 
The problem is that, like any legal rule, new precedents do not 
determine their own scope. After a new high court ruling, lower courts 
are left with the task of deciding whether their cases are covered by the 
new precedent and, if so, what result is required. As Pauline Kim points 
out, “[e]ven if judges share a preference for complying with legal 
authority, they will differ regarding how best to ‘follow the law’.”59 
Moreover, as Cross explains, a pattern of results attributed to following 
new precedent could be explained by social cultural shifts that are 
influencing both the U.S. Supreme Court and the outlook of the lower 
appellate courts.60 For example, the area of gay rights seems to be in 
the midst of one such shift. 
More importantly, Frank Cross articulates the central problem with 
interpreting the results of precedent studies as evidence that doctrine 
is determining or directing judicial decisions, namely, “the difficulty in 
independently verifying the correctness of a decision.”61 As Cross puts 
it, “an empirical test must produce some external evaluation of the 
validity” of that legal reasoning it tests.62 In other words, to see whether 
some given set of legal decisions shows that legal doctrine does or does 
not determine legal outcomes, scholars need a “test that is more 
authoritative and reliable” than the decisions we are using as our 
sample.63 But it is not clear “how any test relying on the evaluation of 
an external observer could be privileged over the opinion” of the 
decision makers in the study.64 
 
58. David E. Klein, Making Law in the United States Courts of 
Appeals 138–39 (2002). 
59. Kim, supra note 57, at 429. 
60. Cross, supra note 41, at 1469. 
61. Id. at 1499–1500. 
62. Id. at 1467. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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In practice, the studies of precedential effects look at bodies of case 
law that follow decisions to see whether subsequent trends in decision-
making respond in predictable ways to the new precedents. If sub-
sequent case law follows the predicted pattern, it suggests that judges 
are paying attention to legal authorities. Again, as the researchers 
surely realize, this is a question of judicial behavior and psychology, not 
an observation of the ability of precedential rules objectively to dictate 
outcomes in subsequent related cases. Nevertheless, researchers’ reports 
of their methodologies and conclusions sometimes are written in terms 
that seem to conflate subjective judgments by the researchers or 
consultants, or observations of decision makers’ consensus, with observ-
ations of objectively correct legal standards. 
So for instance, one study of lower courts’ reactions to Supreme 
Court decisions describes the way the researchers identified the cases 
that “avoided” the Supreme Court precedent, whose effect they were 
studying, and separated these from cases to which the precedent did 
not apply: 
We . . . read all of the distinguishing decisions to determine 
whether the circuit courts were relying upon minor factual 
differences to avoid applying precedent or whether significant 
factual differences actually precluded the application of the 
precedent. We coded the distinguishing circuit court cases as 
having “followed” or “not followed” an overruling decision, or, 
when factual differences made the application of precedent 
implausible, we eliminated the citation from the analysis.65 
The problem here seems to be exactly the one Cross identified. The 
evaluation of which factual differences are “significant,” and therefore 
make a precedent inapplicable, and which are “minor,” so that failure 
to refer to a precedent constitutes “avoidance,” is precisely the analytic 
choice faced by a judge who wants to decide the new cases in accord 
with existing law. Here the researchers have used their own judgment 
to identify cases in which an obedient judge should follow the precedent 
whose effects they want to measure. But how can we know that their 
judgment is better than that of the lower court judges whose decisions 
they are studying? Moreover, their method, or at least their report of 
it, seems to presume the kind of doctrinal determinacy that they must 
know their experimental methods could never prove. 
In another study entitled Does Law Matter? a researcher used “the 
outcome generated by sophisticated observers who objectively apply the 
rule to facts” to identify “the ‘correct’ legal outcome for the cases in 
 
65. Benesh & Reddick, supra note 57, at 541. 
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the study.”66 Note the scare quotes around “correct,” indicating that 
the political scientist author recognizes the problems raised by that 
attribution. But those concerns seem at odds with the straightforward 
assertion that the standard against which judicial outcomes would be 
measured was obtained by “objectively” applying the legal rule in 
question.67 To be sure, this empiricist describes his work mainly in terms 
of judicial psychology. The article asks at the outset: “What motivates 
judicial decision-making?”68 At the same time, though, his analysis uses 
language that could easily be misunderstood to be reporting evidence 
of the determinative capacity of the legal authority whose effects he 
studied. For instance, he describes the degree of consensus among his 
research subjects on legal outcome as a “proxy” for “the determinacy 
of the law.”69 Moreover, the article links its empirical observations to 
the work of legal theorists who “hypothesize that ideology matters most 
in the law’s ‘open areas,’” speculating that the experimental results 
“suggest that the law’s open areas may be fewer and farther between 
than scholars suppose.”70 
Once again, the point is not that these studies fail to provide useful 
information. Indeed, they offer fascinating evidence of judges’ efforts to 
engage with formal legal authority and predictable patterns of that 
engagement. But such evidence should not be confused with observ-
ations of the extent of doctrinal determinacy, that is, that the legal 
authorities in question are objectively capable of justifying unique out-
comes. In these studies, judicial outcomes are being measured against a 
standard that could never test objective doctrinal determinacy. 
Basically, the researchers use their own legal judgments or the consen-
sus of their research subjects to “identify the legally best answer to a 
question in a case and see whether judges choose that answer.”71 The 
observation that judicial decisions converge on or diverge from the 
outcomes researchers pick, therefore, can provide insights into the ways 
judges think about formal legal authorities and the predictability of 
decisions that turn to those authorities. But it cannot show that those 
authorities are capable or incapable of determining uniquely correct 
legal outcomes or even, strictly speaking, that judges’ decisions obey or 
disobey those authorities. To show those things, we would need a way 
to identify legally correct outcomes that is more legally authoritative  
66. Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-
Subject Adjudication, 40 J. Legal Stud. 333, 335 (2011). 
67. Id. at 349 (noting “[t]o develop a more objective measure of salience, each 
proposition in the sample was compared to the Harris Poll”).  
68. Id. at 333. 
69. Id. at 352. 
70. Id. at 355. 
71. Klein, supra note 42.  
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than that of the judges whose decisions are being studied, and neither 
the researchers’ opinions nor the research subjects’ consensus fits that 
bill. 
Seeking to avoid the difficulty of providing an objective measure of 
substantive legal correctness, Frank Cross devised a study that relies 
on procedural norms.72 He reviewed over 17,000 federal appellate 
rulings, looking to see whether patterns of affirmances conformed to the 
effects of legal norms of judicial deference.73 Under those norms, judg-
ments based on trial verdicts are entitled to greater deference from 
appellate judges than summary judgments with no fact findings. Trial 
judges’ JNOV rulings would get the least deference of all because they 
overturned jury verdicts. So assuming appellate court judges disagree 
with the outcomes in the same percentage of all three kinds of decisions 
they are reviewing, they would nevertheless overturn the three types of 
cases at different rates, affirming judgments based on jury verdicts most 
frequently, summary judgments less often, and JNOVs at the lowest 
rates. Cross found that “the relative probability of affirmance for the 
three types of orders is precisely as the legal model would project it to 
be.”74 This finding surely supports the hypothesis that “law matters” in 
a subjective sense to the judges charged with applying it, a finding that 
has considerable interest in and of itself. And it shows that procedural 
norms influence judicial outcomes in predictable patterns—a crucial 
piece of information regarding the workings of the actual judicial 
system. But it hardly confirms that the rulings in these cases are 
entirely, or even mostly, determined by the law. Once again, these 
results support the hypothesis that judges are making an effort to abide 
by doctrinal rules and methods. But they do not show that doctrine 
determines the eventual results of those efforts. 
After all, the fact that appellate judges were more hesitant to 
reverse the types of judgments most protected by procedural rules of 
deference does not mean that in those particular cases it was legally 
correct for the judges to defer, let alone that it would have been legally 
incorrect in those cases to overturn the trial judges’ substantive rulings. 
Appellate deference—whether great or little—ends somewhere, and 
judicial outcomes that neatly track the different deferential grades do 
not necessarily show that judges got it right in those cases. Indeed, it 
might be said to show that the judges privileged the procedural rules 
of deference in a way that inappropriately overcame the substantive 
doctrine. And certainly it does not show that considering all the 
available doctrine, the appellate court’s ruling was the only justifiable 
outcome. 
 
72. Cross, supra note 41, at 1500. 
73. Id. at 1501. 
74. Id. 
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Cross generally presents his data in terms of “the effects of law on 
judicial decision-making.”75 And he acknowledges that without running 
into the same problem of setting up a questionable external standard 
of correctness, “one cannot test for whether a given court correctly 
applied a procedural rule.”76 Yet Cross’s conclusion summing up his 
research is written in terms that might be confused with statements 
about a more normative and individualized sort of determinacy. He 
explains that the evidence “leaves room for the influence of ideology” 
but “demonstrates that beyond ideological influences, legal rules of 
procedure matter greatly in determining outcomes.”77 Particularly 
because these statements follow an analysis a few pages earlier about 
how “radical critics of law”78 have used concepts of linguistic 
indeterminacy to attack law’s meaning in a way that “carries indeter-
minacy too far,”79 it is possible to mistake the subsequent references to 
law’s role in “determining outcomes”80 as referring to the sort of 
determinacy that Frederick Schauer seems to be describing when he 
articulates the Realist question as “just how often are there legal rules, 
principles, and sources available to justify both of two mutually 
exclusive outcomes?”81 
Moreover, Cross’s research is among the empirical studies cited by 
Schauer as supporting the conclusion that “legal doctrine appears to 
play a considerably larger role in judicial decision-making than the more 
extreme of the Realists supposed.”82 To the extent Schauer means that 
Cross’s study supports the view that judges attend to legal rules and 
norms and make sincere efforts to adjust their decision-making 
approach to respond to their understanding of those norms, this is a 
valid point. The fact that appellate courts were less likely to reverse 
judgments based on jury verdicts than summary judgments indicates 
that judges respond to the levels of deference they understand to be 
prescribed by standards of review. But one cannot extrapolate from 
that result the conclusion that the available legal doctrine determined 
or could determine the results in those cases. 
It is crucial to separate evidence of judges’ subjective experience of 
following legal rules and legal rules’ objective capacity to determine 
legal outcomes. Empiricists Lee Epstein and Jack Knight are generally 
 
75. Cross, supra note 42, at 48. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 67. 
78. Id. at 60. 
79. Id.  
80. Id. at 67. 
81. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 136. 
82. Id. at 140. 
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sensitive to these differences. In recent work, they focus explicitly on 
judicial motivations and aim to theorize and observe a wide range of 
factors that influence judicial decision-making.83 Nevertheless, in 
discussing “how law can affect judicial decisions,” some of their 
language might be read to shift from describing judges’ motivations and 
behavior to unfounded suggestions of doctrinal determinacy.84 So for 
instance, they assert that empirical studies “show that the choices of 
judges map to the dictates of precedent in a large number of cases.”85 
It is not entirely clear what studies they mean to reference, but it is 
clear that to observe that judges’ decisions “map” or follow precedential 
rules, one would have to identify some external standard of “the 
dictates of precedent” in the judicial decisions being studied, a standard 
more authoritative and reliable than the decisions themselves. It is 
equally clear that no such standard has been identified. What is more, 
the only way to set a standard of legal correctness is through a 
normative interpretation of the relevant legal doctrine (and of what 
doctrinal authority is relevant). In David Klein’s words, it “requires a 
researcher to make judgments about the content of the law in order to 
determine whether judges are responding to it.”86 There is no objective 
basis from which researchers can make those judgments. 
In one sense, then, it would be possible to use empirical methods to 
study “the types of cases in which judges are most likely to follow 
existing legal sources, such as precedent,” as Epstein and Knight 
recommend.87 We could study the circumstances in which judges 
consciously resort to doctrine, and which types of legal authorities 
judges are most likely to consult and to reflect in their opinions. But 
we can only observe judges’ attempts to use those sources to decide 
outcomes, not whether the sources determine or constrain the judges’ 
eventual decisions. We can observe and measure judges’ attempts to 
apply the dictates of precedent, but not whether precedents have the 
capacity to dictate judicial outcomes. 
The ambiguity in claiming empirical evidence that judicial decisions 
“map to the dictates of precedent”88 is particularly potent because it 
comes in the context of an article explicitly recanting the authors’ 
earlier position that for judges “maximizing policy is of paramount, 
even exclusive, concern.”89 The change from that previous position 
 
83. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 Ann. 
Rev. Pol. Sci. 11, 15–24 (2013). 
84. Id. at 25. 
85. Id.  
86. Klein, supra note 42. 
87. Epstein & Knight, supra note 83, at 26. 
88. Id. at 25.  
89. Id. at 12. 
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remains important, and controversial, as an argument that judges pay 
more attention to legal doctrine than the authors previously believed. 
But it should not be confused with a claim to have shown that in 
attending to doctrines, judges produce decisions that in fact track 
objective dictates of preexisting law. Epstein and Knight—and for that 
matter all the empirical researchers whose work is discussed here—
would likely agree with this point. Nevertheless, these researchers, and 
others who describe their studies, sometimes use language that almost 
invites conflating evidence that judges are not driven primarily by 
ideology with proof that law, in the form of preexisting legal doctrines, 
is objectively determining, directing, or narrowing the outcomes those 
judges reach. 
3. Testing “Motivated Reasoning” in Legal Decision-Making 
The psychological theory of “motivated reasoning” posits that 
people will tend to find arguments and information more compelling 
when the arguments and information favor their preferred conclusions 
and less valid when the arguments and information conflict with those 
results.90 Some judicial behavior scholars suggest that motivated 
reasoning could explain how judges who sincerely believe they are being 
directed by legal doctrines nevertheless wind up producing decisions 
that appear to fulfill personal policy preferences.91 Like other types of 
judicial behavior studies, experimental tests of motivated thinking in 
legal reasoning have produced mixed results regarding the influence of 
doctrinal reasoning and political attitudes on judges’ decision-making. 
Because these studies are explicitly about the psychological processes 
of decision makers, it might seem like their conclusions would be less 
susceptible to the kind of misinterpretation that conflates evidence that 
decision makers engage with formal authorities with the idea that those 
authorities can—and at least sometimes do—determine legal outcomes. 
Again, the empiricists who conduct and report these experiments surely 
recognize this distinction. The problem is that, in describing their 
methodologies and analyzing their results, the empiricists sometimes 
appear to make assumptions about the extent of doctrinal determinacy 
that readers might misinterpret as empirically grounded. 
One of the leading researchers of motivated reasoning in legal 
decision-making is Eileen Braman, whose 2009 book put the subject on 
the map for many legal theorists.92 Braman’s work provides evidence 
that attitudes can influence legal reasoning in unconscious ways, even 
when decision makers believe that they are following neutral doctrinal 
 
90. Cross, supra note 41, at 1477. 
91. Eileen Braman, Law, Politics, & Perception 30 (2009).  
92. Id. 
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rules.93 For the purposes of this argument, however, the most interesting 
aspect of her work is her conclusion that the influence of those attitudes 
is nevertheless somehow limited by legal doctrines.94 
To test whether motivated reasoning might affect the results of 
legal reasoning, Braman ran a series of experiments using students 
(including law students).95 The studies confirmed that rules looked 
different to decision makers with different underlying cultural and 
political views. Depending on their policy preferences, the students in 
Braman’s studies “saw the very same cases in systematically different 
ways.”96 Braman emphasizes, however, that nothing she found “suggests 
a conscious effort to twist the law to serve one’s opinions.”97 She 
concluded instead that “policy preferences influence legal inter-
pretations,” even when judges believe they are applying precedent to 
produce legally mandated results.98 According to Braman, “motivated 
reasoning happens as decision makers choose determinative evidence, 
interpretations, and authority in the context of stylized norms, enabling 
decision makers to believe they are applying the tools of doctrinal 
analysis in an appropriately unbiased manner.”99 
Braman’s main focus in this work was on distinguishing conscious 
political policymaking from the effects of decision makers’ unconscious 
biases. She interprets her results to support the inference that corr-
elations between judges’ ideology and judicial outcomes are the product 
of unconscious motivated reasoning, not deliberate strategic choices. It 
is important to see, however, that nothing in Braman’s work constitutes 
evidence that legal doctrines are substantively determining outcomes. 
Thus, Braman’s work produces important support for the view that 
judges could subjectively attempt to apply legal doctrines and still 
produce biased results; it does not provide any evidence that legal 
doctrines objectively limit judges biases. Readers of Braman’s work 
might be confused on this point because she sometimes appears to 
assume that such limits exist. At one point, Braman asserts that 
“judges are trained to recognize specific criteria that make some legal 
arguments more persuasive than others.”100 She then explains that 
norms of precedent mandate that judges follow previous rulings by a 
court whose authority is “binding” in cases “with facts closely 
 
93. Id. at 30.  
94. Id. at 31. 
95. Id. at 101–109. 
96. Id. at 109.  
97. Id. at 110. 
98. Id. at 30. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 31. 
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resembling those in pending litigation.”101 She reasons, therefore, that if 
such authority exists, it “should act as a constraint on accuracy-seeking 
judges despite the availability of alternative arguments.”102 She con-
cludes that the effects of judges’ motivated thinking will be contained 
because they “will not extend to choices the law can not reasonably 
support.”103 
Moreover, Braman’s description of her process in designing and 
carrying out her experiments sometimes seems to gloss over the extent 
to which her own normative judgments were involved. Describing the 
authority she chose to use in her experiment, Braman characterizes 
certain cases as “controlling.”104 That description is apparently based 
on her own or some other expert’s legal opinion.105 In other words, 
Braman or her advisors apparently made a judgment that certain legal 
authorities in her experiment should determine her subjects’ decisions. 
Sure enough, subjects who were faced with these doctrinal authorities 
were more likely to decide the hypothetical case contrary to their 
expressed personal attitudes.106 
Braman concludes from this result that these decision makers were 
following a “constrained attitudinal” approach to decision-making, in 
which attending to doctrine depressed the tendency to rule according 
to their own policy preferences.107 What Braman seems to mean by 
“constrained” is that the presence of particular doctrinal authorities 
affected the decision makers in predictable ways that moved them, as a 
group, away from their subjective point of view. Again, this is an 
extremely interesting result with much promise for future exploration. 
What it does not show is that the doctrinal authority Braman 
characterizes as “controlling” could justify a decision in favor of only 
one party, or that it made one result legally more correct than the 
alternative.108  
 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id.  
104. Id. at 135, 138–39. 
105. She also characterizes some doctrine provided to decision makers in 
various ways that indicate her own view that it would be objectively 
legally correct to rule in the same direction as those authorities. For 
instance, she explains that “where there is no direct authority on point 
(the Third Circuit conditions), legal models of decision-making would 
predict a decision in defendants’ direction (against standing) because the 
weight of authority goes in that direction.” Id. at 121 (italics added). 
106. Id. at 139–140. 
107. Id. at 140. 
108. Id. at 150. 
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The fact that a recent precedent is seen by most legal interpreters 
as mandating similar outcomes in new cases that they identify as similar 
cannot prove that the legal doctrine incorporating that precedent 
actually determines, or should determine, those outcomes. More than 
three out of four (77 percent) of Braman’s research subjects who 
decided the hypothetical case in the jurisdiction with the “controlling” 
precedent referred to that case in their reasoning.109 But subjects who 
decided an outcome contrary to the result in the precedent were just as 
likely to refer to it as those who “followed” the case.110 Among those 
who provided this explanation, thirty-eight “cited reasons to follow the 
case; [thirteen] participants noted reasons to distinguish it.”111 In other 
words, the fact that decision makers regarded a case as important to 
engage and sincerely attempted to apply its doctrine did not mean the 
precedent actually controlled the outcomes. 
A more recent study, designed somewhat differently than Braman’s, 
produced some very interesting results regarding motivated reasoning 
in legal decision-making.112 The study ran experiments in which subjects 
were asked to resolve statutory interpretation problems.113 The study 
included over 200 currently sitting judges along with comparable 
numbers of lawyers and law students, as well as over 800 members of 
the general public.114 With this research design, the authors were able 
to compare the responses of the different groups. They found that while 
the statutory analyses of law students and lay persons reflected their 
cultural values, judges and lawyers were apparently not influenced by 
their cultural attitudes when they were engaged in formal legal decision-
making.115 The authors hypothesize that this result is due to a form of 
“professional training and experience” among lawyers and judges, who 
have developed “habits of mind resistant to identity-protective cog-
nition when performing the types of reasoning tasks characteristic of 
 
109. Id. at 149. 
110. Id. at 150. 
111. Id. 
112. See generally Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An 
Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment 
(Yale Law Sch. Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 63, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2590054 [http://perma.cc/ 
SW2A-XMNH] (studying “whether political predispositions influence judicial 
decisionmaking”). 
113. Id. at 21.  
114. Id. at 17.  
115. Id. at 42. Interestingly, the judges and lawyers were subject to motivated 
reasoning similar to that of the other research subjects when they were 
asked to make decisions that did not involve formal legal reasoning. Id.  
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their profession—but not otherwise.”116 This is an empirical finding of 
extraordinary potential for developing an understanding of the moral 
psychology of judicial decision-making. And again the empirical 
researchers are very clear that what they are studying are psychological 
effects in judges, not the determinative properties of the legal 
authorities they consult.117 In describing the design of their study, 
however, the authors mention some normative judgments they made 
regarding the legal authorities they used in their study that seem to 
assume that those authorities have the kind of power to substantively 
determine, or at least narrow the range of, correct legal answers.118 Once 
again, including these sorts of speculative assumptions about doctrine’s 
substantive determinacy tends to muddy the descriptions of study’s 
actual empirical results. 
The researchers asked their subjects to apply a statute prohibiting 
littering to resolve a motion to dismiss in two different versions of a 
hypothetical lawsuit.119 According to the researchers, the facts of the 
two different versions “varied in a manner that had no analytical 
bearing on how the statutory ambiguity should be resolved but that 
was expected nevertheless to invest the outcome with a cultural 
meaning or resonance” that would trigger motivated reasoning.120 In 
other words, the researchers made an evaluative judgment that the 
formal legal authority they used in their experiment had the power to 
set limits on what is or is not relevant to its analysis and application 
to a legal conflict. That evaluation, in turn, implies a belief in substan-
tive determinacy or at least substantive constraint. The problem is that 
when this assumption is followed by the report that legally trained 
research subjects’ analyses of both versions of the problem converged 
on the same outcomes, that observation might be interpreted as bearing 
out the authors’ assumption of doctrinal determinacy. The experiment-
al results do support the inference that judges and lawyers are less 
 
116. Id. 
117.  Id. at 17. 
118.  Id. at 21. 
119. Id.  
120. Id. Interestingly, a real case from which the researchers’ hypothetical may 
have been drawn, involving plastic water jugs left by aid workers for use 
by undocumented immigrants in the Arizona desert, produced a split 
result. United States v. Millis, 621 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2010). The panel 
majority, Judge Thomas and Judge McKeown, both appointed by 
President Clinton, reversed an aid worker’s conviction, holding that the 
statutory term “garbage” was, in this context, “sufficiently ambiguous 
that the rule of lenity should apply.” Id. at 918. Judge Bybee, who was 
appointed by President George W. Bush, dissented. Id. Judge Bybee, , 
explained that in his view “the rule of lenity does not apply here because 
leaving plastic bottles in a wildlife refuge is littering under any ordinary, 
common meaning of the word.” Id. at 919 (Bybee, J., dissenting).  
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influenced than lay persons by individual cultural differences when they 
engage in statutory interpretation. That in itself is a fascinating and 
important result. But the consensus reached by the judges and lawyers 
in this experiment does not show that the statute the researchers chose 
somehow objectively determined those results. 
B. No Imaginable Empirical Method Could Measure Doctrinal 
Determinacy 
Perhaps doctrinal determinacy could be established despite the fact 
that previous empirical studies have failed to do so. Galileo didn’t have 
a telescope powerful enough to observe the astronomical movements he 
predicted, and Einstein didn’t have a supercollider; yet their theories 
about the nature of the universe were still amenable to empirical corrob-
oration once those devices were invented. Can we imagine an empirical 
study that could measure the extent to which legal doctrines determine 
legal outcomes in a given context? Remember Frederick Schauer’s 
question: “just how often are there legal rules, principles, and sources 
available to justify both of two mutually exclusive outcomes?”121 How 
might we seek to answer that question empirically if we could employ 
any imaginable methods and resources? 
1. Imagining a Test 
I have argued that the consensus of research subjects in existing 
studies is not an appropriate measure of determinacy. But suppose we 
could give a very large group of decision makers the same legal problems 
and have them all decide the legal outcomes using all the conventionally 
recognized authority of a particular jurisdiction. And suppose that all, 
or almost all, the decision makers reached the same result. Would that 
not show that the available doctrine determined the answers for those 
cases? A threshold question is a harbinger of conceptual problems to 
come: Who would the ideal research subjects be? A cross section of the 
population? Or a selection of legal professionals—judges and lawyers? 
Of lawyers who specialize in the area of law at issue?122 We are trying 
to test the effects of doctrine on a community of legal decision makers, 
but are we interested in the community that is subject to the doctrinal 
authority we are testing or the professional community that interprets 
that doctrine?  
121. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 136. 
122. We might want to further subdivide them—separating judges from 
lawyers and perhaps separating the lawyers according to their different 
types of practices, theorizing that they might have different approaches 
to the doctrine. Of course, if that turned out to be the case, it would seem 
to support the indeterminacy of doctrine—or would it? Perhaps we would 
see predictable differences along the lines of a legal interpreter’s legal 
experience as part of the structure of our legal system—an “official” part 
that should count toward determinacy, not against it. 
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If the reason we are testing doctrinal determinacy has to do with 
the legitimacy of enforcing legal decisions, it would seem we need the 
agreement of the people who are subject to legal enforcement, which 
argues for using a representative sample of the general public. As 
Martha Minow and Robert Post observe, “[w]e ought to determine the 
law’s legitimacy at least in part from the perspective of those who suffer 
its coercion.”123 On the other hand, we understand the application of 
legal authorities to be a specialized practice that demands skills, 
experience, and knowledge acquired through professional education and 
practice. That argues for using only legal professionals as the test 
subjects.  
A second methodological issue with substantive implications is the 
way the research subjects would access the available doctrine. Suppose 
the study tested judges and lawyers, would they be asked to do all their 
own research? Or would they hear arguments for both sides, and if so, 
who would choose and present the doctrinal arguments? A judge? A 
litigator? A run of the mill litigator or a brilliant one? What if only 
Clarence Darrow could convince the experimental subjects that both 
outcomes are doctrinally possible, would that count? 
For the moment, pass over these complexities. Assume that the 
study can use any of these methods, or all of them. After all we are 
imagining the best possible empirical experiment, unhampered by 
resource limits and logistical problems. Whatever group we choose, 
however constituted, however large, and however they access the legal 
doctrine, problems will persist that will make it impossible to design an 
empirical experiment that could measure doctrinal determinacy. There 
are three problems with translating empirical observations of predict-
able decision-making into evidence of the extent of doctrinal 
determinacy: First, the doctrine may not be what is really producing 
the result; second, the doctrinal result may not be correct; and third, 
the doctrinal result may not be unique. 
The problem is definitional and normative: our empirical test has 
substituted agreement among doctrinal interpreters for doctrinal 
determinacy. Predicating the determinacy of legal rules on consensus 
observation conflicts with our understanding of the normative nature 
of legal decision-making. It seems to me that even under ideal condit-
ions, even virtual unanimity among a large group of decision makers 
that existing legal rules dictate a certain outcome cannot be used to 
show doctrinal determinacy—at least not if the reason for testing 
determinacy is concern about the legitimacy of enforcing legal decisions. 
The concept of doctrinal determinacy we are testing entails that 
there are correct and incorrect answers to legal questions. Even if a 
 
123. Martha Minow & Robert Post, Opinion, Trust in the Legal System Must be 
Regained, Bos. Globe (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/ 
2014/12/09/after-michael-brown-eric-garner-trust-legal-system-must-regained/ 
ySfGQ3UrhSuWFi1hVH0z2K/story.html [http://perma.cc/JU74-R476]. 
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majority are convinced that the available legal authorities support only 
one outcome, how do we know that they are correct? Note that even if 
we were somehow able to observe directly our subjects’ thoughts, that 
would not help us prove doctrinal determinacy. Neural imaging 
techniques allow researchers to see different areas of the brain “light 
up” under different types of stimulation. In the future, we might be 
able to capture visual signs of thoughts and the causal stimuli of 
thoughts, in effect becoming mind readers of both conscious and 
unconscious mental activity. Even if we could read minds, however, we 
would not be able to confirm that the legal outcomes in those minds 
were the result of doctrinal determinacy. We might be able to show 
that a decision maker considered the doctrine in forming her answer. 
But we would not be able to rule out the possibility that some other 
person with more ingenuity, more time and energy, or a greater 
incentive could come up with a plausible account of how the available 
doctrine could support a different answer and, presumably, light up her 
brain in different ways. 
2. The Objection from Scientific Method 
A dedicated empiricist might say that the last point just shows a 
lack of understanding as to how empirical science works. Of course 
researchers can only observe what is there—the results of whatever 
processes they choose to make the subject of the research. And if the 
parameters change, it is always possible that the results will change. So 
the fact that you can always imagine the possibility that the results 
could come out differently under different circumstances does not 
devalue the observed results. Those are simply other situations to be 
tested. The whole point of taking an empirical approach is that 
researchers are looking to see what the results really are under some 
given set of circumstances. If it is important to you how Clarence 
Darrow or Ronald Dworkin’s Hercules would respond to the legal 
problem you are posing, go out and get them—or the closest thing to 
them—and give them the test.124 If you think that cash incentives 
matter, offer a million dollars to the lawyer who can come up with a 
plausible argument for one side or the other. But if you are not testing 
those subjects or those circumstances, it is not fair to invalidate the 
evidence you obtain from the empirical tests you do run with 
metaphysical musing about the road not taken. 
 
124. Darrow and Hercules are, respectively, historical and fictional icons of legal 
acumen. Clarence Seward Darrow (1857–1938), one of the most famous trial 
lawyers of all time, was particularly noted for the persuasiveness of his closing 
arguments, some of which lasted for many hours. As his obituary put it, he 
“spent his life fighting for ‘lost’ causes, most of which he won.” Clarence 
Darrow is Dead in Chicago, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1938, at 15. Hercules is the 
ideal embodiment of judicial interpretation as imagined by the influential legal 
philosopher, Ronald Dworkin. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 239 (1986). 
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The empiricist’s frustrated response just shows the limits of 
empiricism when it comes to understanding legal doctrine and the link 
between determinacy and law’s legitimacy. To the extent that we 
consider legal doctrine determinate, that determinacy exists in 
opposition to consensus or at least independent of it. As the Fourth 
Circuit put it in a decision upholding marriage equality, “A citizen’s 
constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because a majority 
of the people choose that it be.”125 Of course the individuals who 
constitute that majority would not agree that their preferred outcome 
infringes anyone’s rights; they have a different view of where rights 
begin and end. The point is that our basic, admittedly aspirational, 
view of rights and the determinate legal answers they entail constitutes 
those rights and answers as at least somewhat independent of majority 
opinion—exactly to the extent that they are determinate. Therefore, 
relying on majority consensus to set the benchmark by which we 
measure the determinacy of some body of legal authority violates the 
core idea of doctrinal determinacy that we want to test. 
The problem here is that the object of the study is defined by con-
ceptual and normative commitments that prevent, or should prevent, 
acceptance of the empirical results as definitive. Once you make consen-
sus the standard for legal authority, you are back in the territory of the 
government of men. In one sense, it is absurdly obvious that we can 
never occupy any other territory. But the overarching point is that we 
cannot both make subjective judgment the standard of our empirical 
proof of legal determinacy and claim that legal decision-making is legit-
imated by the objective empirical proof of its doctrinal determinacy. 
The empiricist might respond that again I have misunderstood the 
way empirical science works. After all, we often test some real thing’s 
objective characteristics by testing its effect on human subjects. We 
test drugs’ healing capacities by testing their effects on representative 
samples of the population we wish to cure. Just because we have 
substituted the evidence of a drug’s effect on people for a direct physical 
analysis of the drug does not mean we are not testing the drug’s 
objective properties. We are just doing it through our study of the 
drug’s effects on people. Why can we not likewise test legal doctrine’s 
determinacy by testing its effect on decision makers? 
If every person who takes a drug gets well, and every person who 
takes a sugar pill dies, there is an extremely strong correlation between 
taking the drug and getting well—enough to support the inference that 
the drug has the capacity to produce a healing outcome and to start 
prescribing it. Even if it turns out, in subsequent research or clinical 
use, that some people who take the drug die anyway, that does not 
mean the drug is generally ineffective. By analogy, why should the 
empirical test of doctrine not work the same way? After hundreds of 
 
125. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 379 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lucas v. 
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736–37 (1964)). 
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legal decision makers all conclude that the available doctrine justifies a 
decision in favor of only one party in a particular dispute, why should 
it matter that a few subsequent decision makers conclude that there are 
valid arguments for the other side? 
The problem is that there is a crucial difference between law and 
drugs. The difference is that in a drug trial we are not asking what the 
drug’s effects should be. There is no question whether the drug’s ability 
to cure an illness is the right outcome. We have no doubt that as 
between curing and not curing humans exposed to the drug, curing is 
the better result. If many people who take the drug get well and others 
do not, it would make no sense to ask which of those people had the 
“right” response to the drug. The empirical study of legal doctrine is 
different. Law is normative; drugs are not.126 
When people apply legal doctrine to a problem, they are trying to 
get the right legal answer. The very question whether doctrine is 
determinate presumes that if doctrine does determine a result, then that 
is the correct legal result. If 1,000 people take a drug and 999 are cured, 
it is possible that they were cured by something else (that is why we 
have to talk in terms of correlation not cause), but there is no possibility 
that the people who took the drug and were cured got the wrong result 
and should have died. In contrast, if 999 of our legal research subjects 
decide that the preexisting applicable doctrine requires that the plaintiff 
win and one person argues that on the preexisting doctrine the 
defendant should win, we could be convinced that the decision for the 
defendant is the right, or the real, effect of the doctrine and that the 
999 decisions for the plaintiff may be wrong, or at least not uniquely 
right. Moreover, that possibility is part of what makes legal results 
legitimate. 
This seems to suggest that the answer is to develop a qualitative 
standard of legal correctness to use in empirical tests of doctrinal 
determinacy. After all, if law is about justification and reason and about 
not just getting answers but persuading others that those answers are 
correct, it makes sense that we would need to evaluate the correctness 
of doctrinal reasoning in some qualitative manner. We could use qualit-
ative standards to decide which of the 1,000 decisions are correct. But 
this again raises the questions of where to find those external qualitative 
standards and why that source is more authoritative than the opinions 
of our test subjects. This is the problem faced (though not always 
discussed) by current legal empirical scholars examining judicial  
126. Nevertheless, drugs are sometimes used as a metaphor for the way legal rules 
are supposed to work, generally when the writer is committed to a view of 
legal doctrine as objectively determinate. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 
1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Obviously, binding authority is very powerful 
medicine. A decision of the Supreme Court will control that corner of the law 
unless and until the Supreme Court itself overrules or modifies it. Judges of 
the inferior courts may voice their criticisms, but follow it they must.”). 
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responses to precedential change. To show that judges are actually 
following the “legal model” in the decisions they study, they need to 
establish what results the legal model dictates in those cases. But 
accepting our own, or some experts’, view of the correct answers means 
adopting a legal standard that has no claim to authority greater than, 
or even equal to, that of the judges whose decisions we are testing.127 
3. Very, Very Hard Cases 
“Easy’s gettin’ harder every day.” 
—Iris DeMent128 
Another objection to the argument that doctrinal determinacy is 
not empirically observable might be said to come from common sense, 
in particular the experience that many legal questions are easy to 
resolve. Are there at least some legal questions where the correct 
application of legal doctrine is so obvious, and so obviously one-sided, 
that we can see that doctrine does determine their outcomes? What 
about the radar gun that catches someone driving eighty miles per hour 
in a fifty-five miles per hour zone or the tax return postmarked April 
16 or the even easier cases where the driver is going forty-five miles per 
hour and the return was mailed on April 10? These are the cases you 
would never expect to find on a law school exam, and, upon finding 
one, the wise law student would read the question over again, knowing 
he must have missed some doctrinal wrinkle that would make the 
question capable of spreading a curve. In real life, these cases rarely 
make it out of the law office because lawyers advise their prospective 
clients that the argument against them is too much of a slam dunk to 
make litigation worthwhile. To say nothing of the cases that are so easy 
they never make it into the law office because everybody knows what 
the lawyer’s advice would be. Can we not at least observe doctrinal 
determinacy in these cases, and if so, why can we not quantify its 
presence? Could we not, in principle, count those easy cases in a given 
jurisdiction at a particular point in time and consider their number 
relative to the total number of cases a proportional measure of doctrinal 
determinacy?129  
127. Cf. Cross, supra note 41, at 1467 (“Still, one could reasonably question 
how any test relying on the evaluation of an external observer could be 
privileged over the opinion of the judge who decided the case.”). 
128. Iris DeMent, Easy’s Getting’ Harder Every Day, on My Life (Warner 
Bros. Records Inc. 1994). 
129. In fact, this is what I imagined Schauer had in mind when I read his 
observation that  
the empirical assessment that the Realists have urged may in fact 
turn out for some courts and some issues and some types of law to 
be less inconsistent with traditional view of law than most of the 
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The answer turns on the difference between predictability and 
doctrinal determinacy. Easy cases are predictable.130 But that does not 
mean they are determined by law in the sense that there “are cases, 
statutes, maxims, principles, canons, authorities, or statements in 
learned legal treatises available to justify decisions in favor of” only one 
of the “parties in all or at least most litigated cases.”131 Even legal 
questions in which a single, clearly articulated source of law seems both 
uniquely salient and readily applicable to the situation at hand are still 
not necessarily answered by that legal rule. There is no logical—or 
distinctively legal—reason why the apparently most salient legal rule 
has to control the outcome or be applied in the way most legal 
interpreters would apply it. Measuring doctrinal determinacy by count-
ing easy cases assumes that it is doctrine that makes the difference 
between hard and easy cases. But, to date, nobody has been able to 
articulate any formal criteria for identifying easy cases. So we fall back 
on “the sense of the community or the intuitions of . . . ‘first-rate 
lawyers’” to identify when a case is easy.132 
Undeniably, we experience some legal cases as easy to resolve. We 
answer them immediately with a single, obvious legal rule that seems 
to cover the situation. The problem is that when we pause to think 
deeply about the question and to look into the available doctrine with 
the idea that we might find an alternative answer, the easiness begins 
to evaporate. Often this transformation happens because a client has a 
reason to want to draw the opposite legal conclusion and the resources 
to employ a lawyer to try. When the client and the lawyer have the 
motivation, the time, and the money, an easy case can become very, 
 
early Realists imagined. It may well be, for example, that the 
principal determinant of judicial decisions on questions of statutory 
interpretation is the ordinary meaning of the words of the relevant 
statute, and that the chief determinant on questions of contract 
law in appellate cases is the traditional rules and principles and 
doctrines of contract law. . . .  
Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 142. 
130. See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 11, at 416 (“[A]n easy case . . . one 
in which a clearly applicable rule noncontroversially generates an answer 
to the question at hand.”). 
131. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 135. See Sanford 
Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 353, 357–58 (1986) (“[C]an any formal criteria be 
offered, or are we ultimately left to decidedly informal norms . . . ?”). 
132. Levinson, supra note 131, at 357. Note the divergence of these two standards. 
One is a collective, consensus, group social phenomenon, identifiable by its 
very normalcy, its middle of the packness, its average, regular, mainstream 
middling quality. The other is a standard of individualistic excellence, a 
matter of distinction and separation from the pack, a question of turning to 
the highest level of enlightened, elite professional judgment available. 
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very hard. Importantly, a legal outcome supported by this kind of very, 
very hard reasoning is not disfavored in any legal sense. 
Understanding how easy cases turn very, very hard with thought, 
time, and money explains how legal doctrine’s indeterminacy fits with 
our general social ability to grasp and follow rules despite the 
acknowledged indeterminacy of language and why general rule 
coherence cannot legitimate enforcing legal decisions. Like it or not, we 
are stuck with the attributes of language because language is law’s 
medium. As Wai Chee Dimock observes, “law is a linguistic artifact, 
dependent on words and haunted by that dependency.”133 Many legal 
theorists dismiss as trivial legal indeterminacy based on general ling-
uistic indeterminacy.134 They point out that, as Wittgenstein stressed, 
this kind of linguistic indeterminacy does not render language unintell-
igible. We can still understand one another. According to Wittgenstein, 
the meaning of rules, including legal rules, is intelligible  with reference 
to a social context or a community of language users.135 The application 
of any preexisting language rule to a previously untried situation can 
be understood through our understanding of the whole way of life of 
the community in which we are speaking.136 Thus Wittgenstein did not 
view reliance on community agreement as a problem for language usage 
or for our capacity to understand and behave according to rules. To the 
contrary, it is our ability to reference community approval, according 
 
133. Wai Chee Dimock, Rules of Law, Laws of Science, 13 Yale J.L. & 
Human. 203, 224 (2001). 
134. Frederick Schauer acknowledges that the “open texture of 
language . . . produces open texture in law.” Frederick Schauer, On the 
Open Texture of Law, 87 Grazer Philosophische Studien 197 (2013). 
It was HLA Hart who famously called legal rules open textured. Hart, 
supra note 6, at 121 He considers this fact insignificant for doctrine’s general 
capacity to determine legal outcomes, as does Brian Leiter who, like H.L.A. 
Hart, points out that this kind of “common sense” general language 
indeterminacy “resides ‘at the margin of rules’” of all kinds. Leiter, supra 
note 3, at 64 (quoting H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 132 (1961)). 
Leiter and Schauer, along with many others, conclude that because open 
texture is endemic to all language, it is not particularly significant for law. 
Id, at 62; Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 162–63. 
135. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1–5 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe ed., trans., 2d ed. 1963). 
136. Id.; Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language 
2–6 (1982). Since Fuller wrote, a further powerful critique of objective 
language based on an exegesis of Wittgenstein’s work was developed by Saul 
Kripke. Kripke showed that preexisting language rules of any kind cannot 
logically determine the outcomes of problems the rules have never previously 
been used to decide. Even expressions of the basic mathematical rule of 
addition cannot determine a logically correct answer for a new problem solely 
on the basis of the preexisting language rule itself. Instead the application of 
any rule in a situation in which the rule has not been previously applied 
depends ultimately on the approval of a community of language users. 
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to Wittgenstein, that makes it possible for us to “follow” any rule to a 
conclusion we have not reached before. 
The community agreement basis of language meaning is still a 
problem for legal rules, however, to the extent that the legitimacy of 
enforcing those rules depends on their determinacy. Legal rules are used 
to resolve, temporarily at least, disagreements between individuals and 
groups in a community. So when disagreements about the application 
of legal rules break out, it is no answer to say ‘this is what the 
community agrees it means’ because, by hypothesis, a lawsuit is a 
disagreement about the rule’s meaning or its application to the situation 
at hand. Moreover, disagreements about the meaning of legal doctrine 
often mirror existing political divisions in “the community.” Of course 
there are often disagreements and differences of opinion regarding the 
meaning of other sorts of rules. So why is this a special problem for 
legal rules? We come back to the problem of enforcement and legal 
decision-making as a trigger for government coercion. In the judicial 
context, we have a situation where the conflict between meanings must 
be resolved and, once resolved, will be enforced, if necessary, by vio-
lence. General language indeterminacy is a special problem for law, 
then, because of its interaction with adjudication’s commitment to 
resolving disputed meanings and to enforcing that resolution with 
threats and violence. 
Moreover, there are serious problems with defining the community 
that could determine legal meaning. Here, the methodological problem 
with choosing research subjects resurfaces in a more substantive form. 
On the one hand, if the community to whom we appeal for legal 
understanding is the society at large, it is unclear how that can confer 
authoritative doctrinal meaning. Legal authorities are defined, at least 
partly, by their separation from the general background norms of the 
community in which they will be enforced. A legal decision comes from 
a conventionally designated decision maker’s interaction with some 
officially recognized legal authority. Part of what makes a decision legal 
is that it is arrived at through methods designed to produce outcomes 
that are different from the results produced by the decision maker’s 
ordinary approach. As Schauer puts it, “every one of the dominant 
characteristics of legal reasoning and legal argument can be seen as a 
route toward reaching a decision other than the best all-things-
considered decision for the matter at hand.”137 So it cannot be that the 
correctness of a legal decision ultimately depends on the same kind of 
general community approval that the decision maker would use in 
nonlegal interpretations of language rules.138 
 
137. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 2, at 7.  
138. There is a difference, of course, between what most people think the right 
thing to do is and what most people think the law says is the right thing 
to do. But recent work on motivated thinking, including the studies 
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The lack of objective, acontextual linguistic meaning is not a 
problem for ordinary social interaction because we act, as Wittgenstein 
says, impulsively, provisionally, without stopping to think and without 
hesitating to question the meaning: “When I obey a rule, I do not 
choose. I obey the rule blindly.”139 The fact that communication is 
understandable despite linguistic indeterminacy does not necessarily 
make linguistic indeterminacy legally unproblematic or unimportant. 
Our whole notion of the application of legal rules, is built on a kind of 
hesitation before making a choice one way or another.140 If we are asking 
whether something is or is not a violation of law we are already stopping 
to think; we are pausing to ask questions about meaning. In that sense, 
even before formal decision-making, law is about interrupting the 
ordinary process of social communication and action. You might even 
say that law is that interruption. In fact, you could see law as a set of 
obstacles or roadblocks, set up in one’s course of affairs—points at 
which one stops, looks about, and says ‘now what may I do’? What 
must I do? What must I avoid doing? And the warrant for asking these 
interrupting questions is the notion of some external authority, some 
source other than oneself, or the opinion of one’s usual associates or the 
community at large, that might justify one response over another. 
So when we engage in doctrinal reasoning to justify a particular 
legal result, we are doing something quite different from, perhaps the 
opposite of, blindly following rules. So it seems that easy cases remain 
easy only because we approach them differently—blindly—from cases 
we perceive as hard. And turning that hesitating, qualifying, deep 
thinking approach on an easy case can transform it into a very, very 
hard case. 
Legal arguments for the very, very hard flipside of easy cases were 
being made and taken seriously long before the realists’ skeptical 
twentieth-century critique.141 For instance, in 1794 the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania heard a habeas claim by “Magdalen and Zare, two 
 
discussed in the last section, suggests that decision makers are not capable 
of neatly separating these subjective beliefs about the right outcome in a 
dispute from their interpretations of the rules that they engage to reach 
a decision. See supra Part 2. 
139. Wittgenstein, supra note 135, at 85. 
140. As Desmond Manderson writes, a legal outcome “might be obvious. But 
it cannot be made without a moment of reflection.” Desmond Manderson, 
Modernism, Polarity, and the Rule of Law, 24 Yale J.L. & Human. 475, 
480 (2012).  
141. As Brian Tamanaha has shown, the legal realists of the twentieth century 
were hardly the first to recognize doctrine’s potential to generate different 
legal outcomes. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist 
Divide 67–90 (2010). 
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negro women, committed as the absconding slaves of Mrs. Chambre.”142 
The plaintiffs claimed their liberty under the Pennsylvania Act of 1780 
for the gradual abolition of slavery, which freed any slaves brought from 
abroad to Pennsylvania who were “retained in this state longer than 
six months.”143 Apparently aware of the statute, the white widow who 
brought Magdalen and Zare from St. Domingo to Philadelphia was 
careful to take them to New Jersey after five months and three weeks.144 
The plaintiffs’ lawyer pointed out, however, that their stay in Penn-
sylvania had exceeded six lunar months.145 He contended that “even if 
the computation by calendar months were more usual at common law, 
a different construction would be adopted in favour of liberty, and to 
prevent an evasion of the most honourable statute in the Pennsylvania 
code.”146 
At the time, this was most likely an easy case. It was likely 
predictable that the court would rule, as it did unanimously, that the 
statute’s time frame should be understood as calendar months, and the 
women remanded back into the service of Mrs. Chambre.147 But that 
result was not determined by the statute’s “six months” rule. As a 
matter of preexisting legal rules and principles, the court might have 
chosen to construe the statute to incorporate the liberty right conferred 
by the Pennsylvania Constitution, or the judges might have found that 
the statute’s application in this case violated that right and was 
therefore invalid. Such a result would have been quite unpredictable. It 
would have been a very hard result to justify but entirely legally valid. 
Nor do very, very hard cases necessarily involve high-minded 
arguments about liberty and equality or any overtly political principle. 
Consider In re Fordham,148 a 1996 decision that tells the story of an 
easy case turned hard by resources of time, money, and ingenuity and 
offers a real-world example of how empirical approaches to doctrinal 
determinacy obscure and distort law’s normativity. The opinion rules 
that Laurence Fordham, then a partner in a Boston firm, violated the 
Massachusetts Professional Code of Conduct by charging excessive 
fees.149 The client Fordham was found to have overcharged was 
Laurence Clark, a repairman who came to Fordham’s house to work on 
an alarm system. While there, Clark mentioned to Fordham’s wife that 
 
142. Commonwealth v. Chambre, 4 Dall. 143, 143 (Pa. 1794). 
143. Id.  
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 144. 
147. Id.  
148. In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996). 
149. Id. at 818. 
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Clark’s son, Timothy, had been arrested for driving under the influence, 
and she suggested that he talk with her husband about the case.150 By 
the time the Clarks consulted Fordham, they had been to three other 
lawyers, all of them criminal attorneys experienced in the defense of 
DUIs in that jurisdiction.151 The three experienced criminal lawyers all 
offered to take Timothy Clark’s case for flat fees ranging from $3,000 
to $10,000, and they all advised him to plead guilty and accept 
placement in an alcohol rehabilitation program, which he did not want 
to do.152 
A glance at the facts that led to Timothy Clark’s arrest makes clear 
why the criminal attorneys advised him to take a plea. When Clark was 
stopped by police, his license already had been suspended for multiple 
speeding violations.153 He was driving erratically, going fifty-five miles 
per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone, having just cut through a 
parking lot.154 His speech was slurred, his breath smelled of alcohol, he 
was unsteady on his feet, and he was unable to walk a straight line or 
recite the alphabet.155 Two breathalyzer tests yielded readings of 0.10 
and 0.12, both above the statutory limit.156 The piece de resistance was 
an open quart bottle of vodka in his car; it was half empty.157 To the 
experienced DUI lawyers, this looked like an easy case, as I daresay it 
would to most of us. There was a single, salient legal rule—thou shalt 
not drive drunk with a suspended license—and plenty of evidence that 
Timothy Clark was caught doing exactly that. It looked like the kind 
of case that should never make it into court because the right outcome 
was so obvious: If Clark went to trial, he would lose. 
Laurence Fordham had never represented anyone charged with a 
crime, let alone a DUI, but he was an experienced civil litigator.158 He 
took Clark’s case—and won.159 In the process he filed four motions and 
billed over 200 hours—153 hours of his own time and 74 for junior 
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associates—for a grand total of over $50,000.160 Two of Fordham’s 
motions were successful.161 One got the charge of driving on a suspended 
license dismissed because Clark had not received notice of the sus-
pension.162 The second was a suppression motion challenging the 
breathalyzer results, using a plain meaning argument that (like so many 
plain meaning arguments) looks simultaneously brilliant and laughable. 
A Massachusetts statute required that multiple breathalyzer results be 
within 0.02 of each other to be admissible.163 Fordham argued that 0.10 
and 0.12 were not “within” a range of 0.02.164 The judge bought it.165 
Ultimately, Fordham convinced the trial judge to acquit his client 
on the DUI charge. After the bench trial Clark paid a $50 fine for 
speeding and $50 costs for driving an unregistered vehicle, and he 
walked away.166 The remaining problem, of course, was that he now 
owed his attorney $50,000. Although a bar hearing commission declined 
to sanction Fordham, on appeal four judges of the Massachusetts high 
court held that Fordham had violated the rules of professional ethics 
by charging excessive fees.167 
To justify sanctioning Fordham, the court’s decision draws on the 
opinions of four lawyers who testified as experts at Fordham’s ethics 
hearing.168 Effectively, the court runs something like an empirical test 
of doctrinal determinacy, using the expert opinions as a baseline of the 
easiness or hardness of Clark’s case, and so of the appropriateness of 
Fordham’s fee for defending Clark. The bar counsel’s experts agreed 
with the criminal attorneys who had counseled Clark to plead guilty 
that “the issues presented in the case were not particularly difficult, nor 
novel” and “[t]he degree of skill required to defend a case such as 
this . . . was not that high.”169 In other words, this was an easy, doctrin-
ally determined case.  
The experts further agreed that the usual time a lawyer would 
spend on a case like this would be about twenty to forty hours, and the 
court reports this along with the consensus that the case presented no 
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unusual facts or legal issues.170 Fordham’s experts, of course, character-
ized the case as “extremely tough” for Clark, and “an almost impossible 
situation in terms of prevailing on the trier of fact” without the 
suppression of the breathalyzer results.171 But the court emphasizes that 
even Fordham’s own experts admitted that the facts of the DUI case 
were not unusual and the legal issues “pretty standard.”172 The opinion 
basically holds that the case’s “normal circumstances” and standard 
legal issues create a ceiling for the amount of time and effort an attorney 
could reasonably spend on this easy case—even if the extra time spent 
changed the expected outcome.173 
The opinion justifies sanctioning Fordham by accepting the 
majority expert consensus that his approach to his client’s case was out 
of proportion to a fixed, objective level of difficulty presented by the 
facts of the case in light of the available doctrine.174 Quantitatively, the 
results are four to one that the case is easy (or seven to one, if you 
count the three criminal attorneys the Clarks consulted before they 
hired Fordham).175 Qualitatively, Fordham’s treatment of the case as 
very hard is invalidated by his own admission that he had never tried 
a criminal case and the fact that all seven of the attorneys who saw the 
case as easy are acknowledged experts in the doctrinal areas typically 
involved in DUI cases. Based on these empirical results, the court 
concludes that Fordham’s fees were “clearly excessive” because he billed 
for an incredibly hard case (for acquittal) when in fact this was an easy 
case (for conviction).176 
In so doing the court implicitly denies that the doctrine applicable 
to Timothy Clark’s case could legitimately produce more than one 
possible result. What makes this decision so peculiar is Fordham’s con-
crete demonstration that a different legal decision maker could reach a  
170. Id. at 821–22. 
171. Id. at 822 (quoting experts’ testimony). 
172. Id. (quoting expert’s testimony).  
173. Id. It is possible that Clark would have been better off with a DUI 
conviction than $50,000 in debt. There is an argument that, whatever the 
result, Fordham’s bill was outrageously out of sync with the modest means 
of his clients and that they did not, and could not have, understood what 
they were getting themselves into when they hired Fordham. The case is 
full of twisted issues of class and status. Besides the implication that 
Fordham took advantage of his unsophisticated working class clients, the 
court may have been offended by what they regarded as the spectacle of 
an elite civil litigator amusing himself in state criminal court—slumming, 
like a socialite in a dive bar. The court’s ethics opinion never says 
anything like this, but it bubbles up between the lines. 
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175. Id. at 822–23. 
176. Id. at 822–23, 825. 
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different outcome based on the available doctrine. To seven experienced 
DUI lawyers, Clark’s case looked like an easy case for conviction, but 
Fordham persuaded one other legal decision maker that there were 
“cases, statutes, maxims, principles, canons, authorities, or statements 
in learned legal treatises available to justify decisions in favor of both 
parties . . . .”177 The person he persuaded just happened to be the 
criminal court judge. 
Maybe Fordham was a brilliant lawyer, or maybe he was lucky. 
Certainly he had a much richer resource base from which to operate 
than is generally available to lawyers who defend DUI cases. Billing by 
the hour, he and his associates had time to read, think, draft, and think 
again about the various arguments and claims they could make 
deploying different selections and combinations of the available legal 
doctrine in what turned out to be four heavily briefed pretrial motions 
and a bench trial. In the process, Fordham (or possibly one of his junior 
colleagues) came up with a way to make an easy case very, very hard. 
Perhaps the high court judges who sanctioned Fordham thought 
his successful defense of Clark was just plain wrong. Because they were 
not reviewing the criminal court ruling, they could hardly say as much, 
but they may have simply believed that the law applicable to Clark’s 
case was not really indeterminate. They may have thought that what 
really happened here was that a foxy attorney with the kind of resources 
available to only a tiny fraction of potential litigants (and far beyond 
his client’s modest means) poured all those resources into finding a way 
to avoid what was the only outcome actually justified by the available 
doctrine. This big-shot litigator might have intimidated or snowed a 
credulous criminal court judge, but he was not going to get away with 
that kind of nonsense at the state’s highest appellate court, described 
on its website as “the oldest appellate court in continuous existence in 
the Western Hemisphere.”178 
Whatever its rationale, the opinion effectively holds that the 
available legal doctrine determined a conviction in the underlying DUI 
case on the basis of empirical evidence. Fordham was sanctioned for 
seeing (and winning) this as a very, very hard case when in fact it was 
an easy (and unwinnable) case. That result exemplifies what is wrong 
with an empirical approach to doctrinal determinacy. The court relies 
on expert consensus to make a normative judgment about the case but 
presents it as empirical observation of the objective nature of the case. 
In so doing, the court both obscures the normative nature of its decision 
and denies the characteristic normative value of law as a source of 
regulation, protection, and duties whose definitions are not dependent 
on social consensus or professional expertise. 
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But notice that the opposite result would be troubling as well. In 
fact, Fordham’s case demonstrates what is so threatening institution-
ally about the idea that doctrine may be indeterminate even in easy 
cases. For if the available doctrine in Clark’s DUI case could justify a 
win for either the defendant or the state, those results were certainly 
not equally available to all DUI defendants. Fordham’s expensive 
defense of Clark highlights the role of economic power in accessing the 
full legal value, as it were, of the available legal authorities. Indeed, 
anyone who has ever worked in Big Law would recognize Fordham’s 
approach as ordinary industrial-strength corporate litigation practice, 
even if it was highly unusual for a “standard operating under the 
influence case.”179 
Of course it would be naive to deny that in the real world criminal 
justice outcomes are affected by how much money a defendant has to 
spend.180 But it is one thing to think that resource differentials occasion-
ally or even regularly distort justice. It is something else entirely if the 
legal system is constructed so that legal authority’s full legitimate 
potential can be systematically mined in direct proportion to a party’s 
economic power. After all, Fordham didn’t come up with his winning 
doctrinal strategy in a sudden stroke of genius. The ethical problem of 
Fordham’s fees only surfaced because Fordham’s interpretation of the 
available doctrine took a lot of time to develop, the kind of time most 
DUI attorneys do not have, because their clients, like the working class 
Clarks, cannot afford to pay for it. By sanctioning Fordham for ex-
cessive fees, the court marginalized the impact of wealth on justice that 
Fordham’s successful defense demonstrates. The stark calculation—
$5,000 to lose, $50,000 to win—is made to look like a freakish outlier 
created by unprofessional conduct, rather than the normal course of 
justice in a system whose doctrinal resources are fully available only to 
those who have the capital it takes to unearth them. 
III. Why We Should Care About the Impossibility of 
Measuring Legal Determinacy Empirically 
In the early decades of the last century, it was the Legal Realists 
who made a point of insisting that the belief that legal doctrines decided 
legal outcomes was at least partly an empirical matter. In the last half 
of the twentieth century, social scientists took up the realist challenge. 
These researchers’ studies of judicial decision-making showed that legal 
outcomes correlated with non-doctrinal political and personal factors, 
at least in some courts in some types of cases. Many political scientists 
and some legal theorists concluded that these results vindicated a 
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critique of doctrinal reasoning as nothing but an illusory cover up, a 
judicial shell game used to distract from courts’ use of decision-making 
power to advance political agendas and re-inscribe personal biases in 
law. Some scholars, however observed that not all judicial outcomes 
correlated with judges’ ostensible attitudes and that there was reason 
to consider that formal law “matters” to the process of judicial decision-
making. Recently researchers have designed a number of empirical 
studies with the express goal of understanding to what extent and how 
legal decision makers attended to formal legal doctrine in the process 
of making their decisions. 
The problem is that empiricists studying the role of legal doctrine 
in decision-making and, more often, legal theorists referencing their 
work, discuss the results of this research in ways that appear to conflate 
two very different aspects of what it means to say that formal legal 
doctrine “matters” to legal decisions. While it is possible to observe and 
collect data about judges’ engagement with preexisting legal doctrine 
and to predict legal outcomes based on estimates of how judges will 
react to changes in legal authorities, it is not possible to empirically test 
the extent to which any given set of legal authorities can determine 
legal outcomes. 
We need to disentangle two different ways of understanding the 
proposition that “law matters” in judicial decision-making. One way to 
understand this statement is as a descriptive proposition about judges’ 
behavior that is susceptible to empirical study. The other way is as a 
claim about the capacity of preexisting authorities to determine 
uniquely correct legal outcomes or ranges of outcomes. No matter how 
closely the second seems to follow from the first, it is always a normative 
claim. When we talk about judges’ practices and whether judges really 
use doctrinal analysis in forming their opinions, we sometimes blend 
subjective motivations with objective results. But it is one thing to talk 
about—and to test empirically—judges’ attempts to engage with legal 
doctrine in ways that fulfill the culturally and politically prescribed 
judicial roles of finding and following applicable law. It is something 
else to discuss whether applicable preexisting legal authorities can be 
identified objectively and, once identified, can be read to prescribe legal 
outcomes. 
Moreover, as the Fordham case shows, this distinction holds even 
for “easy” cases where one finds a broad consensus on the correct legal 
doctrinal result. One way to understand the Fordham court’s ruling 
would be to say it confused predictability and determinacy. The case 
against Clark was a predictable loser, but its outcome was not 
doctrinally determined; with luck and resources, it turned out that there 
were more available doctrinal possibilities than easily met the legal eye. 
In a recent article, Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer warn that legal 
scholars should “resist the impulse to subsume law within other sch-
olarly disciplines” and in particular, not lose sight of “law’s normativity 
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as a powerful factor.”181 In a sense, the conflation of predictability and 
doctrinal determinacy in empirical legal analysis is an example of the 
problem Nourse and Shaffer identify. 
I do not mean to deny the value of predictability and the need to 
understand doctrine’s role in it. These are things that can be studied 
empirically. To practice law we need to know the predictability of 
decision makers’ reactions to a given legal conflict. Indeed, those pre-
dictions are one of the main things that clients come to lawyers to find 
out. And a lack of predictability in legal outcomes creates its own 
legitimacy problems. Among other things, unpredictable law enforce-
ment punishes people who had no way to conform their behavior to 
avoid losses. So if we can understand how decision makers’ reactions to 
legal doctrine affect that predictability, that is something worth know-
ing. But Fordham demonstrates that, perhaps oddly, legitimate legal 
enforcement also depends in part on unpredictability—the unpredict-
ability that comes with knowing that a legal decision maker’s mind is 
open to the possibility that an unexpected outcome based on an unan-
ticipated doctrinal analysis might be correct.182 To say that the predict-
able doctrinal results are the law is to deny this crucial aspect of law. 
The Fordham case also reminds us that empirical studies that 
compare outcomes reached by decision makers who are all working 
under the same conditions are profoundly unrealistic models of how 
legal questions are actually decided. The fact is that in our legal system 
there are enormous differences in the resources that are poured into 
influencing decision makers to find one or another result in a given legal 
conflict. Besides differences of money and time, different motivations, 
efforts, skills, ingenuity, and invention contribute to the search for legal 
outcomes. To take away these differences would be to create a qualitat-
ively different legal system. These resource differences can change our 
view of the available doctrine. If Fordham’s client had been the son of 
a millionaire, would Fordham still have been sanctioned?  
The Fordham court’s ruling obscures the implications of resource 
disparities for the legitimacy of DUI prosecutions and perhaps more 
broadly for the availability of justice. Ordinarily we think of these 
resource differences and their effects only as a source of injustice. But 
considering the problem of indeterminacy in this light shows that they 
are also the hallmark of legal potential—a potential for re-envisioning 
what is legally possible in a given situation that can be tapped if we are 
willing to devote sufficient resources to that problem. If the inability to 
fully access those resources is a source of injustice in our legal system 
today, it is, paradoxically, a source of future justice—a legal fount of 
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potential rights.183 The Fordham court’s empirical approach to doctrinal 
determinacy denies that dynamic doctrinal potential. That approach 
obscures the legitimacy problems generated by the combination of in-
determinate legal doctrine and variable economic power but also the 
potential of indeterminate law for achieving justice. 
Recognizing that doctrinal determinacy is not empirically testable 
moves the legitimacy worries brought on by indeterminacy back to the 
forefront. Those renewed concerns, in turn, open up the search for other 
distinctively legal characteristics that might ground legitimate law 
enforcement. Generally, we assume that to the extent legal reasoning is 
distinct from ordinary decision-making and a legitimate basis for 
government enforcement, it must entail some kind of substantive deter-
minacy. But formal legal reasoning and, in particular, the subjective 
experience of following rules might still contribute to a distinctive mode 
of decision-making that is significantly different from ordinary indi-
vidual all-things-considered reasoning even if legal doctrine is indeter-
minate. It might be that the distinctive legality of doctrinal reasoning 
resides in its form not its substance. This move seems to offer a more 
genuine possibility of escaping the formalist/realist divide than a con-
tinued focus on assessing levels and areas of determinacy and indeter-
minacy in legal decision-making. 
The possibility that formal doctrinal reasoning matters, not because 
it produces some measurable level of substantive determinacy but 
because of its effects on decision makers, might change our view of an 
ongoing shift away from formal adjudication. Legal decision-making 
through adjudication based on doctrinal reasoning is on the wane, at 
least in the United States.184 The numbers of cases brought through full-
fledged formal trial in courts today is a tiny fraction of cases filed—
something like one in one hundred overall for civil cases.185 Most civil 
cases settle out of court, and most criminal charges are resolved through 
plea bargains.186 Cases that do go through court proceedings receive less 
formal treatment—most courts of appeals allow oral argument in only 
a handful of cases, and the vast majority of appellate court decisions 
are now labeled nonprecedential.187 Many conflicts that we recognize as 
having legal dimensions are now handled nondoctrinally through 
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informal means of dispute resolution. Even cases involving politically 
charged issues and the assertion of civil rights are much more likely to 
go to arbitration and mediation and be resolved without formal 
doctrinal reasoning or doctrinal justification. 
This shift away from formal doctrinal practices tends to be justified 
by a rather hazy notion that substantive doctrinal determinacy sets 
some background limits on informal results. Continued confusion 
between evidence that doctrine matters to decision makers and evidence 
that doctrine determines substantively correct legal answers tends to 
support this view. Somewhat paradoxically then, the idea that sub-
stantive doctrinal determinacy might be measured empirically under-
girds the dismantling of formal doctrinal reasoning. The shift toward 
informal legality—via arbitration, shrink wrap contracts, mediation, 
settlement, plea bargaining—is said not to endanger the rule of law 
because decisions made through these alternative methods unfold “in 
the shadow of the law.” In this view, formal doctrinal practices are 
dispensable as long as the substantive shadow of doctrine protects the 
legality of informal approaches to legal problems. But what if it turns 
out that law’s shadow has a recognizable shape only through formal 
practices and the actual real time process of human interaction with 
formal materials? 
What if the importance of legal doctrine in legal decisions is not 
substantive determinacy, but psychological and social effects on 
decision makers—effects that might come about partly, or even entirely, 
from the formal practice of doctrinal reasoning? If so, the legitimacy of 
our legal system is not necessarily undermined by doctrinal indetermin-
acy because doctrine may serve other legitimating functions. Those 
functions, however, may disappear with the abandonment of formal 
practices. 
Rather than substantively determining legal outcomes, reading, 
thinking, and writing in legal doctrinal forms may lead decision makers 
to go about their work in ways that are different from their ordinary 
all things considered approach and so render their decisions distinct-
ively legal. Perhaps the process of reading formal legal authorities and 
making formal doctrinal arguments about what those authorities 
require facilitates legal decision makers’ bracketing their ordinary 
subjective perspectives, thus aiding impartiality. This is the type of 
doctrinal effect that would be empirically testable. 
Support for the possibility and testability of such an effect comes 
from recent studies conducted on the psychological effects of reading 
different forms of literature.188 Their results show that after reading  
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literary fiction, rather than popular fiction or nonfiction, individuals 
performed better on tests of what psychologists call “theory of mind.”189 
The texts employed in this research varied widely in subject matter and 
were each just a few paragraphs long. The researchers therefore 
conclude that “it is unlikely that people learned much more about 
others by reading any of the short texts.”190 Instead, they theorize that 
the effects they observed are due to the formal qualities of the texts. 
Rather than exposure to any substantive content, they theorize that 
the observed differences were due to literary fiction’s “systematic use of 
phonological, grammatical, and semantic stylistic devices” that enlist 
readers in the project of creatively developing fictional characters.191 
Here is evidence that the experience of reading a certain type of 
material can produce a change in a reader’s understanding or judgment 
on account of the structure of what is read. Likewise, doing doctrinal 
analysis might prime a shift in readers’ minds. And that shift might 
cause changes in judicial decision makers’ outlooks. If there are demon-
strable effects on the cognitive abilities and habits of readers and writers 
of formal legal doctrine, such effects could be viewed as adding rule of 
law legitimacy to the extent that they facilitate legal decision makers’ 
looking outside their own usual perspectives—the sine qua non of legal 
decision-making. 
Conclusion 
Empirical social science can help us understand what motivates 
legal decision makers and, more specifically, how decision makers 
interact with and are affected by formal legal doctrine. In principle, at 
least, we can observe and measure the effects of legal decision makers’ 
engagement with legal authorities. But empirical studies can never tell 
us whether legal doctrines are determinate in the sense of providing 
evidence that preexisting legal rules actually mandate certain results. 
To have explanatory power, empirical studies of legal determinacy 
would have to identify a standard of legal correctness, which necessarily 
conflates some individual or group’s view of what the law says with the 
potential of existing doctrine. The upshot is that any empirical test of 
doctrinal determinacy would need to use some standard based on 
quantitative or qualitative evidence of individuals’ understanding about 
what the doctrine directs. Either of these choices violates the core 
conceptual and normative understanding of legal reasoning as 
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something other than the best all-things-considered decisions of any 
individual or group. 
The idea that empirical studies can be used to measure the extent 
of doctrinal (in)determinacy bolsters an assumption that doctrines can 
and do provide determinate answers, at least in easy cases. That 
assumption, in turn, can be used to justify dispensing with the actual 
practice of formal doctrinal reasoning. This is an odd result. We rely 
more and more on informal adherence to doctrines that are presumed 
to somehow set substantive boundaries instead of requiring the formal 
reasoning practices that might actually be the source of distinctively 
legal decisions. If it turns out that doctrinal reasoning’s significance is 
more a matter of the effects its formal practice produces in decision 
makers than the production of substantive answers, then we have less 
reason to be confident that anything we would recognize as rule of law 
is preserved when legal disputes are resolved by informal non-doctrinal 
processes. 
Rejecting the possibility of empirically testing the extent of 
doctrinal determinacy does not mean rejecting empirical legal studies. 
But it does renew concerns about how to understand legal reasoning as 
a distinctive process. Those concerns, in turn, open up the search for 
ways, other than determining substantive answers, that traditional 
legal forms might ground legitimate law enforcement. This suggests 
some possible new directions for empirical legal research aimed at 
understanding how formal doctrinal reasoning affects decision makers,. 
In particular, empirical methods might be useful in seeking to under-
stand if there are ways that formal legal reasoning, especially the 
subjective experience of interpreting and applying legal doctrine, 
influence decision makers to shift away from their ordinary individual 
all-things-considered reasoning, without determining substantive 
outcomes. 
 
